Central Asian Political Transitions

Political Transitions
in Central Asia
CA-PoliticalTransitions.com
Jonathan K. Zartman

Home	VULNERABILITY AND CENTRAL ASIAN DEVELOPMENT	Research Papers
Table of Contents	CHAPTER II: SECURITY VULNERABILITY	Chapter Three

The Military and Political Dimension

The concept of vulnerability in international relations

provokes a first reaction that centers on the security dimension. The well established place of vulnerability as a theme in security studies suggests that discussion of vulnerability begin with the security dimension. However, security studies generally do not begin with vulnerability as the organizing center of ideas to be developed. Military vulnerability chiefly concerns the risk of war. Common descriptions of the risk of war deal with the national capabilities of potential enemies and their proximity. This section offers measures of security vulnerability, including national capabilities and military size as crude indicators of power and the use of borders and border crossings as crude indicators of contact access. A third measure is border pressure, meaning the hazards of a security vacuum.

Measuring Indices

National Capabilities

In order to compare a vulnerability approach with more common realist

approaches, some index of power must be constructed. Bueno de Mesquita uses Correlates of War project data.⁽¹⁾ The method used here calculates national capability within a regional system, but national capabilities cannot be applied with equal effect at greater distances from the "core." Some coefficient must be adopted to compensate for distance.⁽²⁾ The example provided in Appendix A uses Bueno de Mesquita's formulation. ⁽³⁾

Contact Access

Stuart Bremer's use of the Correlates of War data set provides

a relevant empirical measure of the factors disposing toward risk of war. He concludes that, out of all the suggested factors for increasing war, contiguity yields a probability ". . . thirty-five times greater than the probability of war when contiguity is absent, there can be little doubt that the effect of state-to-state contiguity on the occurrence of war is quite strong."⁽⁴⁾ This justifies the use of borders and border crossings to measure security vulnerability.⁽⁵⁾ The use of borders and border crossings to measure vulnerability also describes the Russian situation since Russia's legal borders lack defenses, whereas the former Soviet border remains the line of effective enforcement.⁽⁶⁾

Despite the ease of operationalizing power in terms of numbers of men

(or ships, planes, tanks, or guns), military capabilities in terms of numbers are losing relevance in explaining foreign policies and international relations because domestic organization and stability play such a large role. Since Bremer shows that a preponderance of military power tends to peace and not war, the measurement and comparison of military sizes also lose salience. For instance, direct use of force by Russia would trigger repercussions from international organizations which presently account for substantial western investment and aid. Russia can ill afford either the political or the direct financial cost of military action but possesses many other levers of power.

The military dimension requires less direct attention in this study

because Russia and the leaders of the Central Asian states have said that they do not feel any immediate military threat.⁽⁷⁾ This signifies a change in Russian policy as it has evolved from the early 1990s. In Frederick Starr's realist vision of Central Asian security, these countries will be exposed to threats in the same way that in physics nature abhors a vacuum.⁽⁸⁾

Border Pressure

Some Russians would view this security vacuum as an expression of Russia's

vulnerability. The perception of a security vacuum results from the effects of cross-border pressures and threats caused by differentials of economic growth and political freedom.⁽⁹⁾ Neighbors of lower economic growth performance, or higher levels of social conflict, produce migrations and instability.⁽¹⁰⁾ On the other hand, greater economic growth leads to greater national capacities which could potentially support belligerence toward states with resources but lower economic power.

While borders change rarely and national capabilities change slowly,

when cross-border complications of a power vacuum are included, this domain of vulnerability can change repeatedly and in significant degrees. For example, increasing Uzbek vulnerability to Tajikistan, and to Afghanistan through Tajikistan, has forced Uzbek policy changes. Measures of "power-vacuum" vulnerabilities are needed to fill out this model. Possible measurable qualities include incident rates for socially organized violence, disparity between the enforced versus internationally recognized borders, disparity between the distribution of the dominant 'ethnos' and state boundaries, percentage scale of armed opposition groups and disproportionate ethnic group representation in positions of economic and political influence. The best available data to approximate these factors include the percentage distribution of sources of refugees and the differentials on the development index in the attached appendix B.

Even granted the costs and limitations on the usability of the Russian

military as illustrated by the debacle in Chechnya, Russian military capabilities dwarf the fledgling armed services of these republics.⁽¹¹⁾ Because of the risks of internal instability, the Uzbek potential for interference, their shared vulnerability to China and the lack of alternatives, Central Asian elites do, by default, rely on Russian help.⁽¹²⁾ The predominance of Russian officers in the fledgling militaries of the Central Asia states prevents policies that could run against Russian interests to the extent of military conflict.⁽¹³⁾ Beyond using Russian officers, these states also host Russian military bases and associated troops. These Russian troops based in Central Asia do more than symbolize Russia's influence, they illustrate Russian potential for interference as portrayed by U.S. Senator Charles Rob (D-VA). ⁽¹⁴⁾ This can be plausibly described as a "security community." This security has carried a high cost in dilution of their independence. As illustrated by Uzbek intervention in Tajikistan and the proximity of combat in Afghanistan, these states must consider all three factors, national capabilities, shared borders, and border pressure.

Vulnerability explicitly considers the mediation of other factors: Military

vulnerability considers the mediation of geography. For example, geographical and infrastructure limitations on the mobilization potential of the Chinese military ameliorates the security fears of Kazakhstan.⁽¹⁵⁾ Using security vulnerability to explain policy orientation can proceed by comparing the orientation of vulnerability with the orientation of policy. However, a more persuasive, higher level of argument requires connecting changes in vulnerability with changes in policy.

One such change captured by these measures is the U. S. initiation of

military cooperation with the Central Asian states, culminating in the joint exercises held with the Central Asian Battalion (CENTRAZBAT). The CENTRAZBAT exercises alter the definition of the "security system." Inclusion of the capabilities of outside powers such as the U.S. or even Germany and other European states, into the equation partially dilutes the domination of Russia and China, but as yet no major policy change by the Central Asian states can be attributed to this dispersion of vulnerability because the dilution effect is small.⁽¹⁶⁾ Russian cooperation with China may be a product of increasing convergence of Russian and Chinese vulnerabilities due to U. S. military involvement in Central Asia, as well as Russia's need for money from military sales. In this way, increased Russian sales to China of antiaircraft missile systems to thwart Kazakh air attack capabilities may be related to U.S. involvement in CENTRAZBAT.

Data:

The goal of the compilation and analysis of data need not be comparability

among the three dimensions of vulnerability, but rather comparability within each dimension. The concept has been operationalized subject to the availability of published statistics. The primary objective of defining the geographical distribution of vulnerability has guided the process of data collection. Index numbers express the relative vulnerability of each country within each dimension. In this way conclusions might be drawn regarding the matrix comparing magnitude (scale) with concentrations (or distribution) of vulnerability.

The general principle followed defines the effective number of players

per dimension for each state, which is a collective measure of concentration versus dispersion. For example, a state importing from twelve effective players is much less vulnerable than a state buying from three. With this index, higher numbers indicate lower vulnerability.⁽¹⁷⁾ In the above comparison twelve players would lead to vulnerability of 0.08 versus three players giving a vulnerability of 0.33.⁽¹⁸⁾

Security Cooperation: Interpreting Proportions of Security Vulnerability

A comparison of the orientation of military and security vulnerability

of these five states, measured according to the criteria suggested here, shows wide divergence and a striking significance for the role of China.⁽¹⁹⁾ What is the degree of congruence or divergence of vulnerability for these five Central Asian states? The chart below shows for each country the percentage of its security vulnerability to the same set of surrounding countries. Where these states differ in their vulnerability to their surrounding countries they have little motivation to cooperate. However, they share very similar degrees of vulnerability to China, shown by similar heights of the red bars representing the percentage of their total vulnerability. Therefore, they could benefit from a coordination in their policies toward China.⁽²⁰⁾ In the same way, they share a degree of low vulnerability to Turkey, the green bars, and that presents the possibility of benefits from coordinated policy toward Turkey.

Notice the great percentage of Tajik vulnerability from Afghanistan

(the blue bars) which only Uzbekistan appreciably shares. Kyrgyzstan has little vulnerability (a much shorter bar and lower percentage of its vulnerability), to Afghanistan, and Kazakhstan even less. Therefore, Uzbekistan must exert pressure to gain their cooperation with Uzbek policies toward Afghanistan and to the allied Tajik opposition forces. In the same way that Russia (the darker blue bar) represents a higher percentage of the total security vulnerability for Kazakhstan compared to its neighbors, Kazakhstan cannot enlist cooperation in the security sphere unless the vulnerability of other states to Russia also rises. Only for Turkmenistan does vulnerability from Iran amount to much of a percentage of the total, and only Turkmenistan has accommodated Iranian interests.⁽²¹⁾ For Turkmenistan the height of the bars is more equal, signifying that the "weight" or influence of competing powers is more equal. The greater equality makes possible Turkmenistan's posture of 'positive neutrality.'

FIGURE 4: SECURITY VULNERABILITY SOURCES

Note: For example as shown in the chart, Russia has a 34% dominance of Kazakhstan's security vulnerability which is the aggregation of national capabilities, shared borders and border crossings and border pressure. An example of how the calculations in this chart were made is shown in Appendix G.

FIGURE 5: PERCENTAGE OF SECURITY VULNERABILITY

To Each Central Asian State From Sources of Threat or Instability

Country	Kazak	Kyrgy	Tajik	Turkmen	Uzbek
Russia	34.2	10.3	10.2	13.9	10.4
China	23.7	26.4	21	8.7	20
Afghan.	4	8.1	38.4	17.3	29.3
Iran	3	3.2	2.4	9.8	0
Turkey	7.5	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.7
Tajik.	6.9	27.5	n.a.	18.7	7.6

Please see Appendix G for sources of numbers.

Security Vulnerability Test Case: Uzbekistan

Uzbek Policy Change in Response to Rising Vulnerability

Corollary 1. - Increasing security vulnerability tends to increase state preoccupation with security. Whether through defense buildup or increasing aggression, an attempt is made to exploit the other parties' vulnerability.

The past seven years of independence offer several examples of policy

change due to changing vulnerabilities. Without using the word vulnerability, Martha Brill Olcott cites Uzbek policy toward Tajikistan. From an initial position of support for the government of formerly communist leaders in their violent suppression of the opposition, President Karimov reversed his policy course.⁽²²⁾ What caused this policy change? Olcott does not address this point with precision, but cites three factors in the perceptions of Uzbek elites: (1) the Tajik opposition was able to sustain operations into the indefinite future, (2) the socialization process on the young would produce more committed and more radical leaders in the future, and (3) the growing movement of drugs, arms and Muslim missionaries increasingly threatened social stability. These factors, while highly plausible, can only be quantified within the "border pressure" index. The prospect of a long term continuation of civil war in Tajikistan, whose population includes almost two million Uzbeks, and of sustained destabilizing pressures, represents a form of power-vacuum vulnerability measured by the development differential and refugee statistics of border pressure. Accordingly, we can attribute Uzbek policy reversal to changing border pressure, and measure these changes in the security vulnerability index. Olcott explains the procedure used by Karimov in this policy reversal:

When in the Spring of 1995, Uzbekistan began to push for a negotiated

settlement in Tajikistan, President Karimov successfully pressed fellow Presidents Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan and Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan to modify their policies as well, and then all three in concert began to urge Moscow to force Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov to change his behavior toward the Tajik opposition.⁽²³⁾

Uzbekistan would have faced a greater difficulty enlisting the support

of Presidents Nazarbayev and Akaev if Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan had not also suffered high border-pressure vulnerability to Tajikistan. Hunter substantiates this narration in reporting that one part of the Uzbek strategy included coopting the Islamic opposition: "President Karimov met with some Tajik opposition leaders in spring 1995, without informing the Tajik government."⁽²⁴⁾ This action obviously provoked strong protests from the Tajik government, but it may be considered part of the communication of Uzbek pressure on that government.⁽²⁵⁾

Kulchik, et al, provide an alternative explanation, attributing this

policy change to Uzbek vulnerability to a reassertion of Russian influence:

When the post-Communist Rahmonov government, which came to power in Tajikistan with the help of Uzbekistan and Russia, declared its readiness to join the Russian Federation, a furious Karimov insisted on reaching agreement rapidly with the Islamic-democratic opposition. Rahmonov refused, and Karimov subsequently met with the Islamic leader, Turadjon-zoda, promising to withdraw the Uzbek detachments from the collective peace-keeping forces of the Commonwealth in Tajikistan.⁽²⁶⁾

Context of Uzbek Security Policy

Uzbek President Karimov has established a policy of slow political and

economic reform based upon Uzbek nationalism and secular opposition to political Islam.⁽²⁷⁾ As such, he has targeted the government opposition in Tajikistan as well as domestic Islamic activists as his enemies. This can be attributed to three factors. First, Tajik nationalism holds potential for political instability.⁽²⁸⁾ Second, of all the people of Central Asia, Uzbeks are the most receptive to the mobilizing potential of political Islam.⁽²⁹⁾ Third, the containment of Iran and political Islam earns him foreign patronage. The tensions produced by the politicization of identity can also be seen as a teacup tempest spinning off by proxy from the ideological competition between Iran and the United States.⁽³⁰⁾ This contrasts with the Turkmen policy of cooperation with both Iran and Afghanistan for the sake of future export infrastructure access.⁽³¹⁾

The following table compares the effect of this change on the security

vulnerability of each of the Central Asian Republics, together with the effects of an opposition victory in Tajikistan (Tajik + Afgh) and the potential involvement of the U.S. or European countries. The defined purpose of these U. S. led CENTRAZBAT exercises requires that the calculation of their influence on the Central Asian security system receive separate treatment. The specified aim of promoting greater independence and balancing against Russia, does not allow potential U.S. or European capabilities to apply to the settlement of the Tajikistan civil war.⁽³²⁾ The relative levels of security improvement from potential U.S.-European involvement do accurately reflect the different degrees of support for the CENTRAZBAT exercises and for security cooperation with the U. S.

This chart compares the gains and losses of the four Central Asian republics

from changes in Tajikistan. Consider the last line, which shows the prospective changes in Uzbek security vulnerability under four possible outcomes. In proportional comparison to the other Central Asian Republics, Uzbekistan does not face greater losses. However, greater national capacities compared to its smaller neighbors enables Uzbek activism. Furthermore, Tajikistan represents 6.2% of Uzbekistan's economic vulnerability and 1.9% of its identity vulnerability. None of the other republics have economic or cultural vulnerability to Tajikistan.

Uzbek policy has tried to avoid the loss associated with an opposition

victory in Tajikistan. According to the framework posited here, an opposition victory would be represented in a sharp security loss-vulnerability increase. This is measured as the shift from 5.67 effective number of partners to 4.53 effective partners. However, Uzbek help did not sufficiently empower the Tajik government to any foreseeable victory over the opposition.⁽³³⁾ This led the Tajik government, in a stratagem for greater Russian help, to call for formal political union with the Russian Federation. The prospects of a political union of Tajikistan and Russia raised Uzbek security vulnerability to Russian reimperialistic strategies. This increased vulnerability can be captured by adding the Tajik border numbers to the Russian national capability numbers. This raises Uzbekistan's security vulnerability by reducing the concentration from an effective number of partners score of 5.67 to 5.2 effective number of partners. (For discussion of effective number of partners see n. 18, p.32).

FIGURE 6: PERCENTAGE OF SECURITY VULNERABILITY

Under Various Outcomes Measured as Effective # of Parties

Greater Values = Greater Security and Lower Vulnerability

Security Vuln.	1995 status	Tajik + Russia	loss (1)	Tajik + Afghan	loss (2)	+ US & Eur	gain (3)	Taj. & Afgh Peace	gain (4)
Kazakh	5.07	4.09	0.98	4.82	0.25	7.07	2.0	5.85	0.78
Kyrgyz	5.37	4.1	1.27	4.33	1.04	5.96	0.59	5.68	0.31
Tajik	4.2	---	-	-	-	4.43	0.23	-	-
Turkmen	6.89	5.17	1.72	4.76	2.13	8.1	1.21	5.71	-1.18
Uzbek	5.67	5.2	0.40	4.53	1.14	6.42	0.75	6.50	0.83

The data show changes in the concentration of vulnerability, measured

as the effective number of partners, (see n. 18, p. 32) in relation to four possible events: (1)Tajikistan joining the Russian Federation (Tajik + Russia), (2) an opposition victory, overthrowing the government of Tajikistan (Tajik + Afghan), (3) potential US and European involvement through the Partnership for Peace and the CENTRAZBAT (+US & EUR), and finally (4) the effect of a real peace in both Tajikistan and Afghanistan (Taj. & Afgh. Peace). for details on the calculations of statistics see Appendix G.

Summary

Rising vulnerability led to the first Uzbek policy change. The increase

in security vulnerability did not arise from growing national capabilities of neighboring states (changing scale), but from changing political configurations that reduced the distribution of security vulnerability. The increases in the concentration of security vulnerability forced policy changes. Uzbekistan interferes with the political settlement of the civil war in Tajikistan as a method of vulnerability management. Uzbek security vulnerability that is more diffuse than its neighbors, together with greater national capabilities, enable this policy.⁽³⁴⁾ High Uzbek capabilities relative to Tajikistan allowed President Karimov to force the Tajik government to negotiate with the opposition. Since then, the negotiated peace settlement between the Tajik government and the opposition has obviated any Tajik union with the Russian Federation, now Uzbek policy has reverted to support for the government against the opposition.

Diagragm: Uzbek Security Vulnerability

Footnotes
1. The Correlates of War data set consists of " . . . three theoretically distinct dimensions of national capabilities: military, industrial and demographic." Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 105. For each dimension the share of the system total is computed in percentage and the three dimensions are added and averaged. The statistics for each dimension are compiled in an appendix as specified:

Military--number of personnel and military expenditure; Industrial--production of ingot steel and industrial fuel consumption; Demographic--total population and urban population.

The Correlates of War definition of national capabilities can be criticized on a number of grounds. First, ingot steel production is losing significance as a measure of economic capability to supply a war effort in an age of satellites, plastics and computers. Second, the focus on war capability offers little relevance in the issues of identity, culture and economics. Third, it reduces the issue to conflict within a dyad instead of a more appropriate and richer matrix. This formula may be more relevant for description and prediction of conflict outcomes in issues such as pipeline export routes or Caspian Sea resource division, but less so for policy orientation. Although it aims to include a broader spectrum through "three dimensions," all these measures represent the military and political dimension according to this study's "three dimensional" framework. Fourth, it is oriented to what states might do when compelled, whereas other theoretically plausible motivations can be proposed, such as the "Emulation Model," as explained in Chapter 5.

2. The theoretical context for this practice includes Quincy Wright's 'distance theory,' which postulates that conflicts increase proportional to the political, social and cognitive distances between them." Secondly the theory of spheres of influence postulates that the applicable force and the degree of risk acceptance of states is proportional to the distance from the power center to the point of conflict. Dieter Weiser, "'Geopolitics' "--Renaissance of a Controversial Concept,"Aussenpolitik, l 45, no. 4, (1994), pp. 402-411.

3. For non-contiguous states the national capabilities are deflated for distance by exponentiating the home composite capability of a nation by its logarithm. Bueno de Mesquita, 105

4. Stuart A. Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965" Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36, no. 2, (June 1992) 327. Bremer's multivariate analysis concludes with a list of the following factors which increase the probability to war (or vulnerability), in order of importance: contiguity, absence of alliance, absence of a more advanced economy, absence of a democratic polity, absence of overwhelming preponderance of military power by one side, and finally, and somewhat contradictorily, the presence of a major power. 337.

5. "These results suggest that Diehl's conclusion that 'although geography may not be the most important factor in international relations, its significance justifies increased and more careful attention from scholars of international conflict' (1991, 24) is true, but understated." Bremer, 336. Referencing P. F. Diehl, "Geography and War: A Review and Assessment of the Empirical Literature." International Interactions,17: 11-27.

6. "Russia constitutes an unstable geopolitical entity. Besides, its national interests still remain to be clearly defined." Yuri Gulobchikov, "Greedy Neighbors Eye Vast Russian Territories," Pravda, October 10, 1997. From RIA Daily Review , Issue 2 [http://www.ria-novosti.com/products/dr/1997/10/28-2-2.htm ] October 28, 1997.

7. Russia has specifically stated in the National Security Concept that it does not fear invasion or military threat. "Considering profound changes in the nature of the relations between the Russian Federation and the other leading countries, one can draw the following conclusion--Russia is virtually not threatened with an all -out aggression in the foreseeable future." "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation," (in English) Rossiiskiye Vesti, Dec. 25, 1997. From RIA-Novosti Daily Review, no. 2. [http://www.ria-novosti.com/products/dr/1998/01/09-002-1.htm.] Jan. 9, 1998. See also Bess A Brown, "Security and Military Issues in Central Asia," in State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 237. The very real threats to the Central Asian states are internal--primarily, weak economies and the danger of political and social instability. . . . The only threat to the independence of the Central Asian states in the foreseeable future is likely to come from Russia where nationalist and imperialist sentiments are experiencing a rebirth--ironically, the country on which the Central Asians are most dependent for the development of their military establishments." p. 250.

8. Stuart Parrott writing of a speech by Starr: "He noted that Moscow's military doctrine announced in the early 1990s defined Russia's defense perimeter as the former borders of the Soviet Union; that many in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are concerned about growing Chinese influence." Stuart Parrott, "Central Asia: The Future Requires a Multilateral Security System," RFE/RL, November 20, 1997 Reprinted in Turkistan Newsletter, Vol. 97:1-113[Turkistan-N@vm.ege.edu.tr]. Dec. 17 1997

9. "Another way of looking at a country's vulnerability or nonvulnerability is to examine what has been called by geographers 'border pressure.' In considering this one takes into account the number of neighboring countries with which a common border is shared, their relative population ratios, their military strength, and their political intentions. 'Such balances are measures only of potential pressure, but they may give a rough index of 'hidden' feelings of being enclosed and threatened on the part of politicians and even whole peoples.' " Michael Handel. Weak States in the International System, (Totowa, N. J.: Frank Cass, 1981) 75, Quoting Cole, J. P. Geography of World Affairs. 4th Edition. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 378. "The appearance of economically weak and non-viable neighbors along new Russian borders presents a strategic threat to Russia. Other states continue to assert themselves on our neighbors' territories." " Its 18,000-km external land perimeter is not fortified in any way. That's why other countries might try to encroach upon our territories any time." Yuri Gulobchikov, ibid.

10. See Mozaffari, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," International Security, 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), 5-43. Deteriorating political conditions in these former Soviet republics would generate large refugee flows especially composed of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers who would present an unbearable burden on already insufficient social support services. Russia is limited by its own economic collapse from restoring imperial influence. The only strategy option seemly engaged is to prevent the economic recovery of the former Soviet states in a race to recuperate from the post-Soviet economic restructuring so that post transition Russia enjoys a national capability differential sufficiently above the Central Asian states to then allow a restoration of hegemony with a lower economic burden for Russia.

11. Jolyon Naegele, "Russia: NATO Urged to Aid a 'Disintegrating" Military,' RFE/RL Vilemov, October 23, 1997. http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/10/F.RU.971023140147.html. John W. R. Lepingwell fleshes out the sources and consequences of this disintegration. John W. R. Lepingwell, "Is the Military Disintegrating from Within?" RFE/RL Research Report, 2, no, 25, June 18, 1993 , 16

12. "That these states may, for a variety of reasons, wish to continue close economic and military ties with Russia is a result, not a contradiction of their independence; their problem may be as much that of locating a reliable centre of power in Russia to deal with, as in reducing the weight of external influence." Fred Halliday, "Forward." Kulchik, Fadlin and Sergeev, Central Asia After the Empire, (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1996,) viii.

13. "The percentage of Russian officers varies, from approximately 90 percent in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to some 70 percent in Kyrgyzstan." Bess Brown, "Security and Military Issues in Central Asia." She footnotes to P. Mukhin, "Slavianskii faktor v armiiakh 'musul' manskykh' gosudarstv SNG," Armiia, 1994, no. 10.

14. "The fact is that Russia maintains Ministry of Defense forces in each Central Asian and Caucasian state except Uzbekistan, some 30,000 troops in all, spread out across these respective countries. The likelihood of the former Soviet Union reconstituting itself is slim, according to Stan Escudero, our ambassador to Uzbekistan. That does not prevent Russia from continuing to treat the Newly Independent States as quasi-sovereign territory, much to their chagrin."Charles S. Robb, "Silk Road: From Conflict to Cooperation," Middle East Insight, XIII, no. 2, (January-February 1998) 27.

15. The Kazakh air force has the capability to destroy the railroad line and the town at a choke point which China would use to send troops to Kazakhstan. Russian sales of antiaircraft missiles to China decrease Kazakh defensive capabilities significantly.

16. Details of the sponsorship of the UN and the U.S. in these exercises is discussed in more detail in the case study of Uzbekistan.

17. For this reason an inverse of that number may communicate more effectively.

18. The accepted measures of concentration are the Herfindahl-Hirshman (HH) index which is calculated as equal to the sum of the squares of the individual factors divided by the square of the total size of the measured dimension. A distribution of 45, 29, 21, 5 yields an HH of .333. It is the inverse of the Laakso-Taagepera effective number (N), which in this example would be 3. This is borrowed from Rein Taagepera, "Expansion and Contraction Patterns of Large Polities: Context for Russia," International Studies Quarterly, 41, no. 3, September, 1997, p. 478. Taagepera explains in the following: "The basic approach in both HH and N is self weighting, in the sense that each component size is multiplied by itself. In principle all components must be measured to determine N, but actually little error is introduced when only the largest components are measured. . . . . concentration depends heavily on the size of the largest components." Taagepera explains that a distribution of 53-17-9-9-8-3-1 would yield the same effective number as 34-33-33, and even if only 53-17 is known plus the total, "N comes out as 2.82 if the remainder is assumed to be divided 15-15. N comes out as 3.23, if the remainder is assumed to be divided into infinitesimally small parts."

19. "However, while the Chinese have their own regional security interests: 'The sense of threat . . . is more strongly felt in the Central Asian states. The Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Tajiks have deeply embedded fears about Chinese imperial encroachments, which were magnified by Chinese claims to large parts of their territory during the 1970s and 1980s..' This unease is exacerbated by China's nuclear status and in particular its continued nuclear testing close to the Central Asian region. Chinese mistreatment of ethnic Kazakhs within its own territory and the strengthening of Beijing's military capabilities are two sources of tension that have adversely affected bilateral relations. Kazakhstan was particularly disturbed by the Chinese purchase from Russia of about 300 missiles and Su-27 fighter aircraft." Mark Stenhouse, "Central Asia - A Catalyst for Change," International Defense Review, Jane's Information Group Limited, December 31, 1994, p. 46. NEXIS.

20. Chinese foreign policy has been pragmatic and stability oriented for a number of reasons. China has sought access to markets and resources in the former Soviet areas of Central Asia. China is expending political and economic resources on the pacification and development of the Muslim areas of Xinjiang Autonomous Region. Xuewu Gu, "China's Activities as a Stabilizing Power in Asia," Aussenpolitik, 46, no. 3. 1995. 310. Population pressures are fueling a growing migration of Chinese, not just of Han Chinese to Xinjiang where it is an open government policy, but also less openly to Russian Siberia which is suffering depopulation by Russians. The large Chinese military causes vulnerability toward all these states, even those who have no border with China, therefore, they all have similar motivations in coordinating their polices toward China. Since Turkey does not share a border with any of these states, their vulnerability is also very similar and low, making Turkey a good balancing partner, and they ought to gain more nearly equally from increased relations and form similar policies toward Turkey .

21. The low national capabilities of Iran as well as Afghanistan means that Central Asian security vulnerability to Iran and Afghanistan is largely a function of shared borders.

22. Olcott explains: "Initially, from 1992 to 1994, the government of Uzbek President Islam Karimov hoped that armed force could keep a 'friendly,' old-style regime in power in Tajikistan, where a victory by 'democratic' and 'Islamic' forces would inevitably embolden their counter parts in Uzbekistan." Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia: The Calculus of Independence," Current History, October 1995, 339.

23. Olcott, 339.

24. Shireen T. Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence, The Washington Papers/168, (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1996), 99.

25. Bruce Pannier mentions another way in which Karimov communicated with the Tajik government. "Tashkent considered the Tajik government to be intransigent at the negotiating table, and, in what many regarded as a message to the Tajik government, Uzbekistan chose to shut off power to Tajikistan in early December."Although the justification cited was unpaid bill, "In October 1996, one report referred to Uzbekistan's supply of electricity to warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum in northern Afghanistan as Humanitarian aid. . . . Uzbekistan is capable of overlooking an unpaid bill or simply taking a loss when the situation merits it." Bruce Pannier, "The Gordian Knot of Energy," Transition, 3, no. 3. February 21, 1997, 37.

26. Kulchik, et al, 47.

27. This use of historical symbols for politicizing ethnicity in the name of "nation-building" carries a high cost in conflict with other states, especially Tajikistan and in provoking alienation that can undermine the legitimacy of the regime. In such a heterogenous context, such a strategy requires continued authoritarianism and a movement to monoethnicity, both of which will raise obstacles to socioeconomic development. See especially, Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Nation - building in Uzbekistan," Central Asian Survey, 15, no. 1 1996, 23-32. Kulchik, Fadin and Sergeev recount the power of nationalist opposition groups Birlik and Erk whose platform Karimov has adopted, and of more Islamic parties Adolat (Justice) and the Islamic Rebirth Party. They postulate that without authoritarian control, "The main part of Uzbekistan's national intelligentsia would undoubtably fall prey to a radical Islamisation of public life. But a similar fate would befall the entire national state elite of the country. Secular, atheistic, Europeanized and steeped in Soviet tradition, it would be unable to fit into the Islamic model of development." Kulchik, Fadin and Sergeev, Central Asia After Empire, 34

28. Karimov is from Samarqand, and knows the deliberate understatement of official statistics claiming only 1.1 million Tajiks in Uzbekistan. Many observers claim that there are five million Tajiks out of a total population of 23.4 million in Uzbekistan. Richard Foltz, "The Tajiks of Uzbekistan," Central Asian Survey, 15, no, 2 (1996) 213-216. "Scholars at Samarkand State University estimate the total Tajik population of Uzbekistan at six to seven million, double or more the Tajik population of the Republic of Tajikistan." In contrast, Hunter notes, "Although the Tajik opposition figure of 6 to 7 million Tajiks in Uzbekistan is exaggerated, 3 to 4 million is closer to reality." Hunter, 98. (For a graphical representation of the relative degrees of ethnic interpenetration for the states of Central Asia, please see Appendix B). "In 1989, Tajik nationalists, gathered as Rastokhez ("Resurgence") People's Organization, demanded that the Tajik majority cities of Samarkand and Bukhara be returned from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan." Dilip Hiro, "The Emergence of Multi-Party Politics in Central Asia: Contrasting Cases" Perspectives on Central Asia, II, no. 10, Center for Political and Strategic Studies.[mail@cpss.org]. January, 1998.

29. The regions marked by greater activity of political Islam are in Uzbekistan or areas bordering Uzbekistan which have a high percentage of Uzbeks in the population. This coincides with Uzbek President Islam Karimov's much greater repression of all political representation linked to Islam whereas Turkmen President Niyazov depreciates the Islamic threat. Karimov uses the Islamist threat for political means knowing that the centers of Islamist activity are linked to Uzbeks. When he was campaigning for election in the Namangan region he was met with demonstrations of severe political opposition organized by Islamist groups. "In 1991-92, for example, Namangan, the largest city in the Fergana Valley, was almost paralyzed by a division of power." Igor Lipovsky, "The Awakening of Central Asian Islam," Middle East Studies, 18. "The genesis and underlying cause of the establishment of a Muslim parallel government has been traced back to President Karimov's visit to Namangan during the presidential election campaign in December, during which representatives of the official clergy expressed support on behalf of all Muslims for Karimov's candidacy. This generated a storm of indignation among the people and resulted in a rally. The Muslim opposition leaders thus set up a parallel Islamic government in Namangan in defiance of the authorities. The movement was supported by as many as 50,000 people in January and February of 1991." Haghayeghi, 94.

30. In an open description of the USA and Iran with the term "ideological opponents" Vadim Karushin supports the concept of identity vulnerability, claiming that the US is engaged in "fanning military psychosis." Vadim Markushin, "Manoeuvres Against Iran's Gas Deal," Krasnaya Zveda, October 10, 1997, RIA Daily Review, October 21, 1997. http://www.ria-novosti.com/products/dr/1997/10/21-1-5.htm

31. Turkmenistan begins from a position of lower security vulnerability, but shows much larger gains and losses from these different scenarios, but has not reacted in alarm because it has reached an accommodation with the Taleban. Turkmenistan needs peace in Afghanistan for export access to alleviate economic vulnerability. "Turkmenistan's President Saparmurad Niiazov, however has said that Afghanistan poses no threat to his country, and he flatly refused to contribute to commonwealth peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan." Bess A Brown, "Security and Military Issues in Central Asia," in State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 237. "The Turkmen president explained his country's lack of concern about defense matters by saying that he could not imagine a threat to Turkmenistan's security for at least the next ten years." p. 247 "In the third year of their existence as independent states, the countries of Central Asia faced no credible threat from outside forces. Even the fighting on the Tajik-Afghan frontier is primarily a struggle between Tajiks; Afghanistan's role is almost incidental, largely confined to providing support for antigovernment forces.

32. "According to a US government official, the exercises are in the spirit of Partnership for Peace, a 27-nation peacekeeping organization whose creation coincided with the policy of NATO enlargement announced in 1994. 'The manoeuvres are designed to breed a familiarity with NATO and to tie these armed forces into the new NATO idea of peacekeeping." Charles Clover, "US Military: Central Asian Exercise Planned," Financial Times (UK) July 5,1997 [http://www.robust-east.net/Net/usa/cntas.html]. According to Atlantic Command, Director of exercises and joint training Gen. Martin R Berndt,"While the exercise is not a NATO Partnership for Peace exercise, it is conducted 'in the spirit of the partnership.' "The exercises included 500 members of the Central Asian Battalion formed from the forces of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 500 U.S. troops participated together with 400 personnel from Georgia, Latvia, Russia and Ukraine. It also included 40 Turkish troops. Linda D. Kozaryn, "Parachutes Ready: Next Stop Kazakstan"American Forces Press Service, [http://www.dtic.mil/afps/news/9709031.html] "Tents, vehicles and helmets the soldiers wore all sported the white and blue motif of the United Nations, including the big blue block letters, 'UN'." Douglas J. Gilbert, "After Jumping, Battalion Learns to Crawl," American Forces Press Service, [http://www.dtic.mil/afps/news/9710011.html].

33. Uzbek motivations for peace in Tajikistan are actually lower than might be supposed. Most refugees in Uzbekistan are Afghan (97.3%) and Uzbekistan's scores above its neighbors on the socioeconomic index, creating border pressure from the development differential. These factors combine to reduce the measured results of a prospective peace in Tajikistan. Consequently, it is peace in Afghanistan rather than in Tajikistan that would more dramatically improve Uzbek security (+ 0.52).

34. Contrasting Uzbek policy with Turkmenistan, Turkmen refusal to cooperate comes from four factors. First, only Uzbekistan has appreciable cultural and economic vulnerability to Tajikistan. Third, Turkmenistan is dependent on Afghanistan for export infrastructure access to break the Russian embargo. Fourth, only Turkmenistan is vulnerable to Iran and Afghanistan. Consequently, Turkmenistan has worked hard for good relations with both Iran and the Afghan Taleban.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER II: SECURITY VULNERABILITY

Chapter Three

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