Small states primarily seek to manage their vulnerability while improving their capabilities. State policy makers perceive vulnerability in terms of exposure to conditions and transactions affecting their security, economy and identity. Vulnerability management by geographical dispersion, by collective encapsulation, or state institutions of market control enables states to promote socioeconomic growth and national political capabilities. Changes in perceived vulnerability force policy modifications. ⁽¹⁾

    This paper explains the policy orientation of the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union as formed in response to vulnerability in an interactional and systemic sense of the word. ⁽²⁾ Three essential dimensions of national interest-- security, economy and identity-- require state policies of vulnerability management. This framework suggests that small states pursue freedom of action, rather than power alone as their primary goal. The concepts of vulnerability and vulnerability management strategies provide effective and quantifiable tools to describe state motivations and policies. Comparing various uses of the term vulnerability in the international relations and economics literature connects economic and security relations to the realm of political identity. Measures of vulnerability appropriate to the states of Central Asia illustrate the explanatory value of vulnerability. These measures allow the comparison between changes in vulnerability and shifts in state policy.

    Central Asia, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has attracted the interests of other states, of oil and mineral development corporations and of international governmental and non-governmental organizations. This interest derives from the potential development of the region in three dimensions: as a center of political instability; as a source of raw materials, and as a demonstration ground for the application of different ideologies. The outcome of the competition by external parties to extract benefits of political stability or control, natural resources or ideological reinforcement depends on the policies set by these states and their success in creating institutions for implementation. The forces affecting state consolidation and policy orientation in Central Asia include this competition among external actors for resources and influence, in addition to internal conditions. This competition offers states opportunities to improve their capabilities but also changes the way states perceive their vulnerability. In other words, the extraction of benefits by competing external actors depends on state policies that are, in turn, a function of the competition itself. State policies mediate between competition and the flow of these benefits. All external parties, therefore, have an interest in the interaction between their competition and the policies of the Central Asian states. An effective explanation of state policies offers insight for foreign policy formation.

CHAPTER I

The Problem

    Existing theories fail to answer crucial questions regarding the politics of transition economies, the failure of development, and the processes supporting regional cooperation. They fail to integrate the operation and interaction of cultural identity with the security concept of power and the economic concept of dependency. This study suggests that the idea of vulnerability offers a sensitive and useful tool for understanding the policy orientation of newly independent states.

    The collapse of the Soviet Union and its Cold War rivalry with the U. S. has sharply reduced security concerns on many levels, including the risk of nuclear annihilation. This has led to a general shift away from security concerns as the primary explanation for state behavior. But the focus has not shifted entirely to economic competition. Accusations of cultural imperialism by the U. S., forecasts of clashing civilizations, and publicity about Western fears of a resurgent political Islam, all point to the broad dimension of culture as an ingredient of national insecurity.

    By comparing these three dimensions, the discussion will extend principles from the domain of security and economics to the realm of national political identity. Military and political security includes the concept of the security dilemma and the hazards of mobilizing a countervailing coalition. ⁽³⁾ States jostling for position and power in the world must be wary of overextension or lack of defenses--strategic insufficiency. ⁽⁴⁾ In the economic realm, monopoly of supply is a form of leverage or power. Similarly, monopsony means many sellers, but few buyers, which gives the buyer leverage or power. International relations literature fails to ask to what extent these principles might apply to cultural and political identity. As stated earlier, competition for resources and influence in Central Asia includes a struggle for ideological reinforcement. The framework here suggests these principles may function in the struggle for influence in Central Asia.

    The first chapter justifies the use of vulnerability as an organizing perspective on Central Asian politics and specifies three dimensions of interactions. Following chapters will use current measures to test the descriptive validity of this approach. Suggested hypotheses require identifying policy changes that derive from government reaction to vulnerability. The four most significant post-independence Central Asian policy changes do manifest a association with changes in vulnerability. Chapter Two defines the security dimension, suggests methods of measuring security vulnerability, and compares changes in these measures with changing policies by Uzbekistan toward Tajikistan. Similarly, Chapter Three uses measurements of economic vulnerability to explain changes in Turkmenistan's policy toward regional cooperation. Chapter Four suggests measures of identity vulnerability, but these measures are not available in a time series. However, state legitimacy can be affected by media portrayal of government performance as well as by faithfulness in cultural representation. Chapter Four examines Kyrgyzstan as an instance in which corruption operated as the intervening variable between a monopoly in one economic sector and repression of the media. As such, this study attempts to apply positivist methodology to a modified constructivist concept. ⁽⁵⁾ Finally Chapter Five compares the value of the vulnerability idea with other non-power oriented approaches.

The Vulnerability Model

Hypothesis: The concentration of vulnerability, rather than the magnitude, hinders the freedom of state actions, the autonomy of development and the exercise of state sovereignty.

    This hypothesis requires a careful distinction between the gross volume of interactions and the number of actors interacting with the state. ⁽⁶⁾ Magnitude of vulnerability will be used to refer to the volume of interaction. Concentration of vulnerability will refer to the number of other actors with which a state has these relations. Competition opens the possibility for a greater volume of international transactions, and an increase in the number of exchange partners. In common parlance, an increase in the number of partners reduces the individual leverage of each partner. Greater numbers of potential interaction partners allow greater variation among states in their choices of partners. This means greater differences in the orientation of their vulnerability and reduced motivation for cooperation. To the extent that the orientations of vulnerabilities converge, cooperation is supported.

    Dispersion allows greater freedom of action because the actions of one of the partners can be offset by greater reliance on others. This means that the state establishes and implements policies with greater autonomy. This study will refer to this change as a dispersion of vulnerability rather than a reduction in vulnerability, though the effect is to reduce the degree of dependence. Dispersion of vulnerability is only one mechanism of vulnerability management.

    The hypothesis presents two independent variables, magnitude of vulnerability and concentration of vulnerability. The dependent variable is the state's course of action. States with high magnitudes and concentrations of vulnerability pay a high price for policy changes or have little freedom of action. States with low magnitudes and concentrations of vulnerability can act freely. Such extremes represent artificial ideal endpoints of a dependency versus independence continuum. This offers little insight into the behavior of real states in the middle of this spectrum that must manage their vulnerability under changing circumstances. Newly independent states must define a policy orientation appropriate for their security environment, the structure of their economy and their historical identity. This represents a type of "state personality." Policy orientation can be described in terms of activities in the three dimensions of national interest. Therefore, description of policy orientation can include the degree to which a state exploits the vulnerabilities of its neighbors through aggression--activity in the security dimension, the degree to which it participates in regional cooperation -- the economics dimension, and the degree of freedom permitted to the media--state control over the identity dimension.

    The initial form of the hypothesis is static and resists testing because it only sets up the framework for a static descriptive correlation between policy orientation and the sources of vulnerability. Such a hypothesis needs restatement in the form of testable subsidiaries to display relevance. The three dimensions of national interest lead to three corollary hypotheses.

    1. Increasing security vulnerability tends to increase state preoccupation with security. Whether through defense buildup or increasing aggression, an attempt is made to exploit the other parties' vulnerabilities.

    2. Increased cooperation tends to be associated with convergence of vulnerability. Increasing convergence of vulnerability with other states tends to increasing cooperation.

    3. Increasing identity vulnerability tends to produce increasing state control over the instruments of cultural production--the media.

    The hypothesis defines the direction of causation as moving from the existing condition of vulnerability, the independent variable, to the resultant state action, the dependent variable. The corollary hypotheses also focus attention on the strategies states use to manage vulnerability. States can partially control the magnitude of vulnerability as a function of their need for outside resources to improve national capabilities versus their tolerance for the risks associated with vulnerability. Individual states control the magnitude of their vulnerability by seeking or withholding from political engagement or economic relations. They also partially shape the concentration of vulnerability by seeking or spurning relations through a deliberate vulnerability-management policy.

    The behavior of great powers in military confrontation has provided the central theme of structural realism. Realism treats economic blocs as instruments for the pursuit of power. However, the end of the Cold War requires a broader theoretical framework to explain international behavior across a fuller spectrum of action. States consider the requirements of strengthening cultural and political identity besides their needs for trade and diplomatic relations when forming policies. However, the international relations literature seldom considers the influence of cultural identity in a testable formulation. A theory based on probability will provide better understanding, but Dina Zinnes explains this must start from description. ⁽⁷⁾

    Central Asian Vulnerability

    The independence of the Central Asian states following the collapse of the Soviet Union has spawned a sizable number of books attempting to "explain" Central Asia. Books written by political scientists, anthropologists, and sociologists offer descriptions that barely conceal implicit assumptions but do not provide systematic tests. Even the most analytical journalism depicts events in Central Asia from a similar base of presumptions without questioning their validity. An element of competition does exist, despite the perfunctory nature of journalism's recourse to metaphors such as "The Great Game" ⁽⁸⁾or "The Silk Road." The potential wealth of Central Asian oil and gas deposits, and the revenue and influence to be gained from serving as a country of transit, activate interest by outside parties, including the United States. The political development of newly independent states does not take shape solely because of competition between external actors, but this framework tries to define the influence of that competition.

    The policy orientation of the Central Asian states as a function of their vulnerability can also be considered as a case study subset of the problems of weak states. There is a substantial literature on the political economy of weak states. This literature supports the use of economic and cultural vulnerability as salient factors in policy formation. This also challenges the structural realist preoccupation with the determining power of the system. Mehdi Mozaffari notes the importance of vulnerability for describing the politics of weak states: "In general, strong states are more sensitive to external threats, while weak states are more vulnerable to internal threats." ⁽⁹⁾

    The states of Central Asia suffer differing degrees of dependence. Dependence is not restricted to simple forms of import dependence such as the need for food, energy and capital. Dependence also includes access to transportation for exports, or the need for security. All exchanges and interactions that offer benefits to national capabilities constitute relations, and any interruption of them causes damage. In this way interactions that fulfill needs can be measured as vulnerability, even though these are commonly considered as forms of dependence. Vulnerability includes the lack of defenses or retaliatory capability and the lack of control over harmful effects from external events not directed by other actors.

    The usefulness of vulnerability to describe Central Asian politics starts with the high importance played by the politics of raw materials. The highly evident domination of export infrastructure by Russia underscores the importance of vulnerability in this context. Keohane and Nye highlight this relevance: "Vulnerability is clearly more relevant than sensitivity, for example in analyzing the politics of raw materials, [and]. . . . sensitivity interdependence will be less important than vulnerability interdependence in providing power resources to actors." ⁽¹⁰⁾

The Russian Vector ⁽¹¹⁾

    Discussion of national vulnerabilities in Central Asia always plays against the background of Russian proximity, power, levers of influence, control over infrastructure and recent historical domination. As examples of these vulnerabilities, these republics lack their own trained native officer corps and they must begin the formation of state military organizations with Russian weapons. ⁽¹²⁾ Their armed forces are as yet minuscule compared to the might of Russia's multiple armies and security forces. Proximity to such a preponderance of power constitutes a self-evident vulnerability to Russian influence or interference. The disruption of economic activity in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted from the specialization of Central Asia economies and their dependence on infrastructure linkages of power lines, railroads, pipelines and highways. These conditions exemplify their vulnerability to Russian pressure and control. In the same way, a few bloody conflicts between ethnic groups accent their heterogeneous ethnic composition and vulnerability to internal disruption by competing identity groups (classified as part of the "cultural dimension"). For example, Kulchik, Fadin and Sergeev rate the prevention of "ethnic-social explosions" as a more significant issue than the replacement of socialism with democracy and capitalism. ⁽¹³⁾

Theories and Approaches

    The element of competition for influence suggests using a game theory analytical structure. However, that would first require defining each actor's utility functions, which in turn requires explaining the origination of these preferences. ⁽¹⁴⁾ Using vulnerability reduction as a utility function sets up a starting point. A sample game theoretic model may ask, "Who wants what, how badly do they want it and what power do they have to get what they want?" Therefore, game theoretic models require the measurement of power as well as the measurement of motivations. This study tries to define why states want what, and how they can pursue it. Explaining how states define their interests aids the understanding of less-powerful states as the objects of competition. ⁽¹⁵⁾

What is Vulnerability?

    Measurable vulnerability requires a meaning of the term somewhat different from the colloquial or even the dictionary usage. Changing electoral district boundaries can make a politician politically vulnerable. Older men and women, children, the poor and the unskilled are called economically vulnerable. U.S. national economic and security concerns, such as boycott vulnerability because of strategic import dependence (oil, rare metals), or a nuclear attack vulnerability during the so-called "missile gap," have led to a significant literature regarding these narrow issues.

    International vulnerability, as the term is commonly used, can refer to ideological matters as much as to the economic and military dimensions. Common usage of the term allows three implications from the relation between perception and vulnerability. First, vulnerability combines perception with durable conditions. For example, some observers talk about the threat from the revolutionary or oppositional potential of political Islam. However, state vulnerability is a function of social and economic conditions that make people receptive to the message of political Islam. ⁽¹⁶⁾ The availability of potentially adverse consequences within a relationship strikes clearly on the perceptions of policy makers even without the objective evidence of adversarial intent. Second, vulnerability includes conditions that do not result from deliberate actions by other states, even antagonistic ones. Third, vulnerability can be managed or ameliorated through state action within certain ranges.

    Vulnerability is a measurable variable describing relations between states. Vulnerability means a lack of deterrence, defenses or instruments of retribution to counteract the potential for harm from systemic instability or the exploitation of conditions and relations by other states. Deterrence, defenses, or the lack of them can refer to qualities of economic and cultural relations in addition to the traditional security issues. This definition is operationalized as the magnitude of interactions, and the number of transaction partners. Vulnerability also means the costs of disruption of beneficial relations. In contrast to threats, vulnerability does not require an active agent or animosity from another party.

    Most discussion of vulnerability considers either the systemic or the exploitation perspective, but rarely both. Thoroughness requires including both types of vulnerability even though it hinders a simple definition. Helge Hveem's concise definition refers to the active agents: "Vulnerability is the lack of control over something that is of interest to a party." ⁽¹⁷⁾ This definition allows Hveem to propose four strategic options that can result from two actors and two variables, interest and control. Such an elaboration of strategic options overlooks systemic vulnerability and consequently the imperative driving states to regulate economic relations with institutional resources. Discussion of strategic options opens up the issue of vulnerability as the product of market structure imperfections (monopoly and monopsony).

Not Threats

    The following section distinguishes between vulnerability and related concepts of threat, the inverse of power, and dependency. The literature of international relations and politics frequently considers the ideas of threat and power. Different authors within the realist view distinguish between threats and vulnerability in different ways. Beverly Crawford states that vulnerability is a function of other states' capabilities, whereas threats are a function of their intentions. ⁽¹⁸⁾ According to Barry Buzan, states attempt to reduce threats by modifying intentions. In his formulation, vulnerability is linked to lack of population, resources and defensible borders, while the capabilities of larger neighbors are threats. ⁽¹⁹⁾

    "Threat" applies primarily to military security. It is often measured by some index of the armed might of another country in proportion to the magnitude of its economy and population, or other measures of size and resource base. ⁽²⁰⁾ Threats play a role in diplomatic language and protocol, but vulnerability may be considered below the level of language. Governments condition their threats and confine them to specific boundaries of antagonisms. Threats can result in acquiescence, negotiation or stalemate as easily as in conflict. Vulnerability is the ground from which threats grow. Ameliorating vulnerability indicates greater foresight than merely reacting to perceived threats. Factors of cultural identity also mediate between capabilities and threats. Military threat perception is largely conditioned by ideology and diplomatic affinity or antagonism. The U. S. worries little about British nuclear capability, but much about Iran's. Therefore, vulnerability describes state motivations even for major powers, and cultural identity mediates between capabilities and threats. The approach suggested here uses the term vulnerability specifically as a way to measure the quality of relations among states without reference to antagonism or amity.

Not the Inverse of Power

    The concept of vulnerability can only improve the understanding of state behavior if it is not treated as merely the mirror image of power: The concepts of power and vulnerability do not offer equal explanations. Realism would predict that more powerful states would tend to win their conflicts. ⁽²¹⁾ In contrast, a vulnerability perspective would not simplistically claim that the state with the least vulnerability in a conflict will tend to win. Rather, the vulnerability hypothesis would emphasize the importance for states to consider how to manage vulnerability when they formulate their policies. ⁽²²⁾ Although lowest-vulnerability winning is plausible, it is not the only prospect. States can build coalitions on shared vulnerabilities and turn their vulnerabilities into a "power resource."     The inverse relation between high state power and low vulnerability can reflect capacities to substitute, synthesize or stockpile against the effects of import interruptions. ⁽²³⁾ However, this inverse relation does not explain limitations and obstacles that powerful states face. High state power does not always equate with low vulnerability. This correlation dramatically decreases and may even reverse for small, weak states. The tactics of heavily indebted, less-developed countries (LDCs) during the debt crisis of the 1980s illustrate the reversibility of the association between power and low vulnerability. Instead of lending countries exploiting the weakness of LDCs, the indebted countries used the threat of default as leverage for substantial restructuring. Countries whose banks had loaned large sums to LDCs were vulnerable to the economic and prestige effects of large bank failures. It was the structure of their relations that allowed weak states to exploit vulnerability in the strong states. ⁽²⁴⁾ In other words, vulnerability and weakness are quite distinct.

    The relation of state power and vulnerability does not follow a straight line. A scatter plot (Figure 1 below) summarizes the relation between capabilities, measured crudely as GDP/capita, and vulnerabilities, measured as an index of export concentration (Ex. Conc.)

FIGURE 1: CAPABILITY VS. VULNERABILITY

    However, the argument against a strict linear correspondence between vulnerability and power does not rely on measurable capabilities, but rather on the possibility of offsetting strategies. Until now the Central Asian states have not discovered strategies to compensate for their vulnerabilities. ⁽²⁵⁾

    A power-centered view over- looks concepts of vulnerability because preoccupation with capabilities results in the disregard of systemic global economic volatility, costs of breaking relationships and strategies of exploiting leverage in other issue areas. Power-centered perspectives that derive from the military and political realms apply poorly to economics, and even more poorly to issues of political identity. Understanding international relations requires more than a one-dimensional approach centered solely on capabilities at the expense of interactions.

FIGURE 2: REALISM

Not Dependency

    A clear understanding of this usage of the term "vulnerability" requires that it be defined in relation to other commonly used terms in explaining state behavior. A vulnerability perspective includes economic dependency as one component, but the vulnerability hypothesis offers a more general explanation from a different set of assumptions than dependency theory. Dependency theory posits that the structure of global capitalism constitutes an asymmetrical distribution of power by which the "core," as represented by industrialized developed countries of the North, benefits at the perpetual disadvantage of the less-developed economies of the "periphery" or the South. Crawford explains the characteristics of third-world economic relations that inhibit their market control:

    Indeed, scholarly discussions of trade vulnerability have been largely reserved for analyses of the less developed countries' economic relations with the Western world. Poor countries are generally considered the vulnerable ones; they have weak states, little control over markets and little to cushion them against shocks imposed by changes in the international economy that threaten their strength. ⁽²⁶⁾

    Dependency theory accentuates the role of the international system in hindering development. While realism simplifies international relations to power relations in the dimension of security, dependency theory simplifies global dynamics to the operation of power in economics. The dependency of  less developed economies can be blamed not just on the deliberate strategy of the core states alone, but also on market conditions such as price volatility and demand elasticity for perishable primary products. ⁽²⁷⁾

FIGURE 3: DEPENDENCY

While dependency theory commonly leads to advocacy of state directed or controlled economic policies, and often of import substitution in pursuit of greater autarky, these strategies pursued exclusively have generally failed. The so-called four tigers of East Asia--Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong--have shown by dramatic sustained economic growth, an example of escape from the trap of dependency. Their strategies have reduced the acceptance of theories of dependency.

    In contrast, the vulnerability perspective attempts to situate analysis at the heart of decision making. This requires a unitary actor perceiving and reacting to vulnerability from many directions and on all three dimensions: political, economic and psychocultural. This puts the decision-maker at the center of a structured web of interactions. ⁽²⁸⁾ The ideas presented here regarding vulnerability should not necessarily be considered as a replacement challenge to existing perspectives, but, according to Helge Hveem, as a supplement to them. ⁽²⁹⁾ The vulnerability perspective attempts to bridge the division between domestic and international politics by the inclusion of domestic conditions exploitable through cross-border connections and transactions. Measuring vulnerability in terms of conditions and relations, rather than of the properties of states, allows explanation of policies.

    Vulnerability also focuses on who sets the rules of the game. Rule setting could imply consensus or successful coercion. Agreement on rules, sometimes called a "regime," requires agreement on issue-specific vulnerability. Coalitions based on a convergence of vulnerabilities set the "rules of the game" just as effectively, and perhaps more durably, than coercion through a preponderance of power. Crawford argues that "agreement on vulnerability is the most stable foundation for multilateral efforts to coordinate vulnerability reduction." ⁽³⁰⁾ But these five different states do not share the same vulnerability orientation, even considering the preponderance of Russian capabilities. Many of their economic problems result from disruption of trade relations within Central Asia, as well as with the rest of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and could be resolved with greater mutual cooperation. ⁽³¹⁾ The positive-sum structure of a cooperative relationship alone is not sufficient for its inauguration. Institutionalized cooperation will require agreement on the rules to overcome other interest-based disincentives.

Three Dimensions of Vulnerability

    Whereas political theory, as generally presented, concentrates on politics and economics, the inclusion of cultural and political identity constitutes a significant challenge to the status quo. States define themselves as representations of cultural and political identity for the sake of state legitimacy. However, this function is vulnerable to the influence of economics forces, cultural contacts and products such as printed media, broadcasts, and even entertainment products. Theorists who have noticed and written about the conjoint importance of security, economy and identity as three dimensions of national interest include Susan Strange and Kenneth Boulding. ⁽³²⁾To the extent that Strange establishes the domain of culture on an equal standing with security and economics, this substantially elevates the role of cultural identity within general political theory. ⁽³³⁾

    Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil introduce Kenneth Boulding's ". . . three interactive but analytically distinct 'systems' " as support for their concern regarding issues of identity. ⁽³⁴⁾ In this typology, classical realism developed the concepts of "the threat system," which became reconstituted into neorealism through the addition of "the exchange system." Boulding contributes an insistence on the primacy of a ". . . 'third system' that covers issues of identity, culture and legitimacy (that is, the "integrative" dimension)." ⁽³⁵⁾ Boulding, therefore, also asserts the significance and the usefulness of cultural identity equal with economic and political relations in understanding a broader domain of state behavior.

    Keohane and Nye support this position when they write: "Vulnerability applies to sociopolitical as well as politico-economic relationships." ⁽³⁶⁾ Peter Willets provides another example in coining the term "cognitive interdependence." With this term Willets describes the signaling function played by political culture as well as domestic institutions. ⁽³⁷⁾ The writings of Alexander Wendt also confirm the applicability of a security-economy-identity matrix to define vulnerability. Beginning from the view that identity generates interests, he specifies four basic interests or appetites generated by the corporate identity of the state, but two of these interests describe political and cultural identity. ⁽³⁸⁾ Cultural identity includes demographic, religious, ideological, regional and familial identity issues. Such components of identity influence state self-preservation as much as elements of economic and military capability. The importance of vulnerability in all three of these dimensions permeates the background of every description of Central Asia.

    Even Kenneth Waltz considers this dimension in so far as cultural identity supports political stability and competence. In Theory of International Politics, Waltz insists that states cannot be considered powerful merely for capabilities within one category, such as military, economics, or size of population, but lacking in others. ⁽³⁹⁾ While economics and military capability may be considered self-explanatory categories for measuring power, Waltz includes the realm of political stability, a product and function of "political legitimacy."

    Political legitimacy or stability is affected by the combined interactions of social factors of identity and cohesion, such as ethnicity, culture, religion, ideology and language (ECRIL). Societal level analysis of international affairs must consider that international events, agreements and changing relations carry differential effects on subgroups, increasing the potential for friction and fission. ⁽⁴⁰⁾ Therefore, political legitimacy involves consideration of the congruence between the style, policies and goals of the state (political culture) and the cultural identity of the people.

    Qualities such as relative political stability and political competence are clearly more difficult to measure with a constructed index than factors such as resource endowment, yet these factors of state legitimacy affect a great deal of international relations. As will be seen in the chapters that follow, factors of political stability contribute to state power and deserve comparison with economics and security issues, but are not easily measured. Accordingly, indicators are employed as a form of indirect measurement.

Summary

    A broad variety of writers approach the subject of national interests with frameworks consistent with a three-dimensional security-economy-identity matrix. Although the term vulnerability does not present an innovation in international relations literature, it suffers from the lack of development or systematic appraisal. The use of the term vulnerability without a defining approach results in a fragmented body of discussion on the topic that calls for integration and analysis. The undeveloped state of the literature on this concept consequently also calls for the specification of the component issues, dimensions, the mechanisms of their interaction and the suggestion of appropriate indices for measurement.

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1. The author thanks Dr. Paul Viotti, Carolyn Geiser, and Marie Ghaffari for criticizing previous editions of this paper.

2. As used in this paper the term "Central Asia" is not just a portion of Asia, but rather the full proper noun for the states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as defined by the leaders of these countries. In a strict sense of the term "central" (small "C") Asia, some geographers would not include Kazakhstan, but would include Afghanistan.

3. When a state tries to improve its security by increasing its military capabilities, these actions are perceived by other states as threatening, as a reduction of their security, and this forces them to respond in kind. The product of each state pursuing security, but collectively all the states experiencing a reduction in security, is the meaning behind the term "security dilemma."

4. Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994) 70.

5. Alexander Wendt lists three assumptions of constructivism. I am here employing the "states as principal units" assumption, but modifying the assumption that "the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material." It is the emphasis on the intersubjective quality of international relations that distinguishes Wendt's constructivism from neorealism. Rather than the material/intersubjective dichotomy of interstate relations, this study uses the three-dimensional identity/ economy/security matrix as the structure of individual states. Since I emphasize the role of prior history constituting a contextual constraint on the social construction of identity, this requires conditional utilization of the third assumption that "state identities and interests are in important parts constructed by these social structures." Whereas constructivism seeks the effects of the system on state behavior, I am looking at a lower level of analysis, the boundary between system and society, as the determinant of state policy orientation. Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review, 88, no. 2 (June 1994) 385.

6. The use of the term "vulnerability theory," while it reeks of presumption, does not reflect any claim that any other author has used or elaborated a full theory of this order. It is merely the present author's shorthand expression for the hypothesis proposed here. As Helge Hveem makes clear, even the more widely employed term "interdependence" is "too normative, too inconclusive and hence too imprecise to be of much use for scientific purposes." Vulnerability theory attempts to surmount these criticisms. Helge Hveem, " Responses to Interdependence: International Restructuring, National Vulnerability and the New Protectionism," Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Hylke Tromp (Brookfield: Avebury , 1989), 129

7. "One needs description before one can construct a pattern." Dina A. Zinnes, Contemporary Research in International Relations, (New York: The Free Press, 1976), 13.

8. A reference to the struggle between Russia and Great Britain for control of Asia, immortalized in the words of Rudyard Kipling and described in the book by Peter Hopkirk, "The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia." (New York: Kodansha, 1994).

9. Mehdi Mozaffari, "The CIS' Southern Belt: A New Security System," Security Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States: The Southern Belt, ed. by Mehdi Mozaffari, ( New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 20. For other treatments of weak states, see Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers: the Dynamics of International Relationships, (New York: The Free Press, 1972), and Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System, (Totowa, N. J. Frank Cass, 1981).

10. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977), 15.

11. The term vector is not used in the geometric sense of the resulting angle or movement from two combined forces, but as the source of origination, means of transmission, such as a vector of disease transmission. "A quantity possessing both magnitude and direction, as force or velocity." Random House Webster's College Dictionary, (New York: Random House, 1995) 1476.

12. This constitutes a dependence on Russia for spare parts and ammunition. However, Russia is desperate to sell military equipment, and they cannot now afford more expensive alternatives. Excessively independent policies might cause Russia to pull on this chain.

13. "The situation in Central Asia is much more complicated and dramatic than that (a confrontation between post-Communist regimes and democratic opposition forces): the key item on its agenda is not the introduction of Western-style democratic procedures as in Russia but in the prevention of an ethnic-social explosion of immense power which will call into question the very survival of local societies." Yuriy Kulchik, Andrey Fadin and Victor Sergeev, Central Asia After Empire, Transnational Institute, (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1996) 27.

14. "Utility" is a term used in economics to mean the benefits or what one party desires from a transaction.

15. " . . . more interesting here is strategic practice, in which others are assumed to be purposive agents with whom one is interdependent. This is, of course, the traditional province of game theory, which normally does the rationalist 'two-step' of treating identities and interests as exogenous to interaction. . . . When these change as a result of interaction, game-theoretic models will misrepresent the possibilities for and the mechanisms of, cooperation." Wendt, 390.

16. "It is the availability of such Islamic doctrines to the Central Asian republics that has greatly contributed to an overall uncertainty with regard to the future political development of these newly independent states." Mehrdad Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995) p. xviii.

17. Helge Hveem, 140. This means that the primary (vulnerable) party tries to increase its control or decrease its interest in the object in question (resources, access to infrastructure, technology, capital, etc.) or, on the other hand, tries to reduce the control of others or increase their interest in what it controls.

18. "The source of vulnerability can be found in a state's capabilities in relation to the capabilities of others; the source of threats can be found in a state's intentions toward other nations." Beverly Crawford, Economic Vulnerability in International Relations: The Case of East-West Trade, Investment and Finance, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 5.

19. " In order to reduce relative vulnerabilities, states must implement policies that expand their own industrial and military power, reduce the military and industrial power of others, and reduce their dependence on others." Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983) 73.

20. "Each state exists, in a sense, at the hub of a whole universe of threats. These threats define its insecurity and set the whole agenda for national security as a policy problem." Barry Buzan, 88.

21. For an excellent discussion of the exceptions, see Barry Wolf, "When the Weak Attack the Strong: Failures of Deterrence," A Rand Note N-3261-A, Prepared for the U. S. Army, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1990).

22. For example, the high U. S. trade deficit with China is an indicator of vulnerability that appreciably hinders the U.S. from using trade sanctions in protest against Chinese human-rights abuse. Other areas of capability do not transfer into power over outcomes in this instance.

23. Waltz notes, "With more money, better technology and larger research budgets, we [America] can synthesize, stockpile and substitute for critical materials more readily than other countries can." Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 146.

24. "In fact, impotence in a structural relation of power asymmetry may actually turn out to be potency in the end." Helge Hveem, " Responses to Interdependence: International Restructuring, National Vulnerability and the New Protectionism," Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Hylke Tromp (Brookfield: Avebury , 1989), 143, see also p. 138.

25. Sources: World Development Report 1996, (Washington, D.C.:World Bank, 1996) 192, 193. On the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index 1.0 signifies only one export product, 0.50, two products and 0.33, three products, and so on.

26. Crawford, 5.

27. These economic relations are marked by the export from the South of primary products with little value added in processing, plus the perishable nature of many agricultural products, competing both against many other suppliers and the capabilities of the North to reduce demand by substitutes and synthetics. Primary commodities also suffer wide variations in price levels and high demand elasticities. The North can control markets and prices more effectively through the policies of the multinational corporations (MNCs) that conduct much of the North-South trade. MNCs enjoy the advantage of many buyers for their products and formidable market entry barriers due to the costs of high technology and sophisticated systems of marketing and distribution.

28. Phrase borrowed from Bonnie H. Erickson, International Networks: The Structured Webs of Diplomacy and Trade, International Studies Series: No. 3 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1975), 6-55

29. "The vulnerability dimension is, in my view, not primarily an element of one theory of interdependence. For one thing, there is no such theory in the strict sense of the word. Moreover, the vulnerability dimension is a perspective that should, in order to become part of a theory (that proposes causal relationships) be integrated into several different theories. They would range from bargaining theory via integration theories and theories in internationalization to theories of economic nationalism and national development strategies." Helge Hveem, 131. (Emphasis in the original).

30. Crawford, 209.

31. The Commonwealth of Independent States was formed as a successor organization to the former Soviet Union, but remains ineffectual and is regarded by some of its members merely as a means to a civilized divorce.

32. P. W. Preston, Political/Cultural Identity, (Sage: Thousand Oaks CA, 1997) 88. Referring to Susan Strange, States and Markets, (London: Pinter, 1988) Strange " . . . identifies four key structures of power in the global system." She refers to the security structure -- military-political, the production structure, the financial structure--ability to obtain or create credit, and the knowledge structure--the generation of ideas and technology. Combining production and financial structures into economics yields the triad of identity-economy-security posited by this paper as the fullest, yet simplest, structure of national priorities.

33. Preston notes that: "Finally, the knowledge structure is one of the underpinnings of the entire system, the production not merely of scientific and technical knowledge but also social technologies of management involved in the business of putting knowledge to work." Strange and Preston claim that: " . . . These networks of power constitute the underlying structures of the global system . . . ." Preston, 88.

34. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, "Revisiting the 'National': Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism?" The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996) 106. They refer to K. E. Boulding, Ecodynamics, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications 1978).

35. Lapid, 106.

36. "The vulnerability of societies to transnational radical movements in the late 1960s depended on their abilities to adjust national policies to deal with the change and reduce the costs of disruption." Keohane and Nye, 15.

37. "The idea of cognitive interdependence has been developed to show that political actors are also constrained by their need to identify coherent patterns of relationships with other actors. Actors need verbal and symbolic support, particularly from other actors seen as having high status." Peter Willetts, "Interdependence: New Wine in Old Bottles," Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics, ed. James Rosenau and Hylke Tromp , ( Brookfield USA: Avebury, 1989) 208. Referencing his own work in "The Politics of Global Issues: Cognitive Actor Dependence and Issue Linkage" Interdependence on Trial. Studies in the Theory and Reality of Contemporary Interdependence, ed. R. J. Barry Jones and Peter Willets (London: Frances Pinter, 1984), 83.

38. His list is: (1) Physical security, including its differentiation from other actors; (2) Ontological security or predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities. This is closely related to (3) Recognition as an actor by others, above and beyond survival through brute force [cultural identity]; (4) Development, in the sense of meeting the human aspiration for a better life, for which states are repositories at the collective level [economy]. Wendt, Alexander. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State."American Political Science Review., 88, no. 2, (June, 1994), 385.

39. "Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence . . . . States have different combinations of capabilities which are difficult to measure and compare, the more so since the weight to be assigned to different items changes over time." Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, ( Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 131 (emphasis in the original).

40. For example, negotiations between the U. S. and Mexico over the North American free trade agreement (NAFTA) were framed in consideration of labor groups fighting the employment effects of trade agreements. "Transactions among societies--economic and social transactions more that security ones--affect groups differently." Keohane and Nye, 34.