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Jonathan K. Zartman
Prepared for
"Uzbekistan in the 21st Century: Transition and Integration"
Samarkand State Institute of Foreign Languages
Samarkand, Uzbekistan
May 12,13, 1999
Published in
Journal of Central Asian Studies
Spring/Summer 1999 vol. III, No.2
Outline |
|---|
| Uzbekistan: An Object of Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | I
| | The Vulnerability Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | II
| | Security Vulnerability . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . | III
| | Economic Vulnerability .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | IV
| | Identity Vulnerability . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | V
| | Vulnerability Management in Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | VI
| | Bibliography . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | VII
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Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia has attracted the interests of other states, of oil and mineral development corporations and of international governmental and non-governmental organizations. Much of the attention has gone to Uzbekistan, the wealthiest and most populous republic. This paper explains Uzbekistan's state policies for managing the transition from Soviet Republic to an increasing internal unity and freedom of autonomous state action. These management policies must balance the goal of improved freedom of action against the need for improving state capabilities. This explanation describes the effect of interactions and conditions, exploitable by other states, in terms of possible restrictions on state freedom of action. The potential for exploitation is summarized as state vulnerability and measured with interactions and conditions. National interests are measured within a stylized schematic of three essential dimensions-- national security, national economy and social support through shared cultural identity. State policies to redirect and shape international interactions and social conditions are then called policies of vulnerability management. Therefore, this framework explores the consequences of state policies in terms of the possible effects of future freedom of state action, as well as on state capabilities. Measures of vulnerability appropriate to the states of Central Asia illustrate the repercussions from Uzbek policies for establishing greater independence, beginning from a heritage that combined Soviet control and cultural Islam.
Interest in Central Asia and in Uzbekistan derives from the potential development of the region in three dimensions: as a center of political instability, as a source of raw materials, and as a demonstration ground for the application of different ideologies. The product of external parties competing to extract benefits of political stability or control, natural resources or ideological reinforcement depends on government policies. The forces affecting state consolidation and policy orientation in Uzbekistan include this external competition, in addition to internal conditions. This competition offers Uzbekistan opportunities to improve capabilities, but also changes the way Uzbek elites perceive their vulnerability. All external parties, therefore, have an interest in the interaction between their competition and the policies of Uzbekistan.
This paper begins by defining vulnerability and justifying the use of three dimensions of national interest. The discussion explains Uzbek policy as formed in the context of, and in comparison to, the other four post-Soviet Central Asian states. The second section delineates the measurement of security vulnerability. The third and fourth similarly justify the indices for economic and identity vulnerability. Finally, the fifth section examines Uzbek policy choices for managing its transition to greater independence.
Transition management is a subset of state policy in general. Analysis of state policy formation requires a conceptual model, and in political science several models offer competing perspectives. State policy could be explained as a product of the personal qualities of the state leader or of the leadership group, or as a product of the bureaucratic processes of the state. All models impose a degree of simplification on a complex reality through assumptions that may be challenged. We should ask, what conclusions logically develop from the assumption that state leaders primarily seek to sustain the autonomy of the state? An autonomous state can be expected to seek capabilities, freedom of action, and to manage the boundary between a subordinate society and other outside parties, such as states, corporations and international organizations. The state derives both its capabilities and its freedom of action from its own polices of managing this boundary between the inside and outside of the state. Management failure can lead to deteriorating political and military security, or declining economic growth or internal instability fomented by cross-border interactions. Abstract concepts such as freedom of action, potential for harm and elite perceptions require concrete indicators as proxies for their effects. Cross-border interactions can be used as indicators of potentially deleterious conditions and relations. The possibilities for harm to the national interests in security, economic and identity can be expressed simply by the word vulnerability. Rather than attempt a conceptual analysis of "vulnerability," the term is only used here to summarize in a simple way the types of interactions and conditions which elites might perceive as indicating potential for harm or external exploitation, measurable through available statistics.
The Vulnerability Perspective
Vulnerability means a lack of deterrence, defenses or instruments of retribution to counteract the potential for harm from systemic instability or the exploitation of conditions and relations by other states. Deterrence, defenses, or the lack of them can refer to qualities of economic and cultural relations in addition to the traditional security issues. This definition is operationalized as the magnitude of interactions, and the number of transaction partners. Vulnerability also means costs incurred by a disruption of beneficial relations.1
The Vulnerability Model
Hypothesis: The concentration of vulnerability, rather than the magnitude, hinders the freedom of state actions, the autonomy of development and the exercise of state sovereignty.
This hypothesis requires a careful distinction between the gross volume of interactions and the number of actors interacting with the state. The term, magnitude of vulnerability used here means the volume of interaction. Concentration of vulnerability will refer to the number of other actors with which a state has these relations. Concentration will always be expressed in terms of hypothetically equal partners. A widely accepted statistical measure allows the varying weights or sizes of different partners to be expressed as a number of effectively equal partners. Competition opens the possibility for a greater volume of international transactions, and an increase in the number of exchange partners. In common parlance, an increase in the number of partners reduces the individual leverage of each partner. When most of the interactions of one state only engage a few other states, it is these partners which represent the orientation of vulnerability. Greater numbers of potential interaction partners allow greater variations among states in their choices of partners. This allows greater differences in the orientation of their vulnerability. These differences reduce their motivation for cooperation. To the extent that two or more states share vulnerability to the same state, or set of states, those first states can benefit from coordinating their policies.
Dispersion of interaction among a greater number of partners allows greater freedom of action because the actions of one of the partners can be offset by greater reliance on others. This allows the state to establish and implement policies with greater autonomy. This study will refer to this tactic as a dispersion of vulnerability, rather than a reduction in vulnerability, although dispersion in effect reduces the degree of dependence. Dispersion of vulnerability is only one mechanism of vulnerability management.
The hypothesis presents two independent variables, magnitude of vulnerability and concentration of vulnerability. The dependent variable is the state's course of action. States with higher magnitudes and concentrations of vulnerability may have fewer alternative responses if their interaction partners decide to oppose a policy change. States with low magnitudes and concentrations of vulnerability have many alternative actions in response to uncooperative behavior by other states--a greater freedom of action. Such extremes represent artificial ideal endpoints of a dependency versus independence continuum. Most states fall in the middle of this spectrum and must manage their vulnerability under changing circumstances.
Newly independent states must define a policy orientation appropriate for their security environment, the structure of their economy and their historical identity. This represents a type of "state personality." Policy orientation can be described in terms of activities in the three dimensions of national interest. Therefore, a description of policy orientation may include the degree to which a state exploits the vulnerabilities of its neighbors through aggression--activity in the security dimension, the degree to which it participates in regional cooperation--the economic dimension, and the degree of freedom permitted to the media--the state control over identity dimension.
This frame of reference begins by treating causation as moving from the existing condition of vulnerability, the independent variable, to the resultant state action, the dependent variable. The reverse direction of causation is equally valid and important: states can manage vulnerability by controlling the magnitude of their interactions with other states. The magnitude of interactions which states permit can be considered a function of their need for outside resources to improve national capabilities versus their tolerance for the risks associated with those interactions. States also partially shape the concentration of vulnerability by deliberately seeking or spurning relations.
The political development of newly independent states does not take shape solely as a product of competition between external actors, but this framework tries to define the influence of that competition. States consider the interruption of exchanges and interactions from which they extract resources to improve their capabilities as an infliction of damage. In this way interactions that fulfill needs can be measured as vulnerability, even though these are commonly considered as forms of dependence.
The high importance played by the politics of raw materials makes vulnerability a useful term by which to describe Central Asian politics. Russia's highly evident domination of export infrastructure underscores the importance of vulnerability in this context. Keohane and Nye highlight this relevance: "Vulnerability is clearly more relevant than sensitivity, for example in analyzing the politics of raw materials, [and]. . . . sensitivity interdependence will be less important than vulnerability interdependence in providing power resources to actors."2
The vulnerability perspective requires a unitary actor perceiving, and reacting to, vulnerability from many directions and on all three dimensions: political, economic and psychocultural. A vulnerability perspective would not simplistically claim that the state with the least vulnerability in a conflict will tend to win. Although lowest-vulnerability winning is plausible, it is not the only prospect. States can build coalitions on shared vulnerabilities and turn their vulnerabilities into a "power resource." However, the argument against a strict linear correspondence between vulnerability and power does not rely on measurable capabilities, but rather on the possibility of offsetting strategies.
Theorists who have written about the conjoint importance of security, economy and identity as three dimensions of national interest include Susan Strange and Kenneth Boulding.3 To the extent that Strange establishes the domain of culture on an equal standing with security and economics, this substantially elevates the role of cultural identity within general political theory. A broad variety of writers approach the subject of national interests using frameworks compatible with a three-dimensional security-economy-identity matrix, including Keohane and Nye. The importance of vulnerability in all three of these dimensions permeates the background of every description of Central Asia. Therefore, the term vulnerability does not represent an innovation, but the undeveloped state of the literature on this concept calls for the specification of the component issues, the dimensions, the mechanisms of their interaction and for suggestions of appropriate indices for measurement.
Data:
The collected data are presented in terms of geographical distributions. The distributions can be compared for orientation and aggregated into an index number expressing the relative concentration of vulnerability. Concentration is calculated as an "effective number of players" per dimension for each state. For example, a state importing from twelve [equal] effective players is much less vulnerable than a state buying only from three. By this index, twelve players represents a vulnerability of 0.08, versus three players giving a vulnerability of 0.33.4
Security Vulnerability
The concept of vulnerability in international relations provokes a first reaction that centers on the security dimension. Military vulnerability chiefly concerns the risk of war. Typical measures of security vulnerability include some index of the armed might of other countries, the magnitude of their economy and population, or other measures of size and resource base.5 The military or security dimension does not dominate the whole picture of Central Asian vulnerability because Russia and the leaders of the Central Asian states have said that they do not feel any immediate military threat.6 The measures of security vulnerability offered here include national capabilities and military size as crude indicators of power, borders and border crossings as crude indicators of contact access, and finally border pressure, meaning the hazards of a security vacuum.
National Capabilities
In order to compare a vulnerability approach with more common realist approaches, some index of power must be constructed. Bueno de Mesquita uses Correlates of War project data. The method used here calculates national capability within a regional system, adjusted to compensate for distance.7
Contact Access
The role of contiguity, more than other relevant factors measuring risk of war, justifies the use of borders and border crossings in an index measuring security vulnerability.8
Power Vacuum
The effects of cross-border pressures and threats caused by differentials of economic growth and political freedom create the perception of a security vacuum.9 Neighbors of lower economic growth performance, or higher levels of social conflict, produce migrations and instability. On the other hand, greater economic growth leads to greater national capacities. This could potentially enable belligerence toward states with undeveloped natural resources and lower defensive capabilities. The best available data to approximate these factors include the percentage distribution of sources of refugees and the differentials on a development index. As illustrated by Uzbek intervention in Tajikistan and the proximity of combat in Afghanistan, these states must consider all three factors, national capabilities, shared borders, and border pressure.
Security Cooperation: Interpreting Proportions of Security Vulnerability
Comparing the orientation of military and security vulnerability of these five states, measured according to the criteria suggested here, shows wide differences and a strikingly significant role for China.10 To the extent that these states differ in their vulnerability to nearby powers they have little motivation to cooperate. This following chart (Figure 1) compares the gains and losses of the four Central Asian republics from changes in Tajikistan. Consider the last line, which shows the prospective changes in Uzbek security vulnerability under four possible outcomes.
In proportional comparison to the other Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan does not face greater losses. However, greater national capabilities compared to its smaller neighbors, enables Uzbek activism. Furthermore, Tajikistan represents 6.2% of Uzbekistan's economic vulnerability and 1.9% of its identity vulnerability. The other republics do not have economic or cultural vulnerability to Tajikistan.
Figure 1: Changes in Security Vulnerability11
Under Various Outcomes Measured as Effective # of Parties
Greater Values = Greater Security and Lower Vulnerability
- Security
Vuln.
|
- 1995
status
|
- Tajik + Rus
|
- loss
(1)
|
- Tajik +
Afghan
|
- loss
(2)
|
- + US
& Eur
|
- gain
(3)
|
- Taj. & Afgh Peace Tajik
|
- gain
(loss)(4)
|
- Kazakh
|
- 5.07
|
- 4.09
|
- -0.98
|
- 4.82
|
- -0.25
|
- 7.07
|
- 2.0
|
- 5.85
|
- 0.78
|
- Kyrgyz
|
- 5.37
|
- 4.1
|
- -1.27
|
- 4.33
|
- -1.04
|
- 5.96
|
- 0.59
|
- 5.68
|
- 0.31
|
- Tajik
|
- 4.2
|
- ---
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-
|
-
|
-
|
- 4.43
|
- 0.23
|
-
|
-
|
- Turkmen
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- 6.89
|
- 5.17
|
- -1.72
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- 4.76
|
- -2.13
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- 8.1
|
- 1.21
|
- 5.71
|
- (-1.18)
|
- Uzbek
|
- 5.67
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- V5.2
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- -0.40
|
- V4.53
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- -1.14
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- 6.42
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- 0.75
|
- 6.50
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- 0.83
|
The data show changes in the concentration of vulnerability, measured as the effective (equal) number of partners, in relation to four possible events: (1)Tajikistan joining the Russian Federation (Tajik + Russia), (2) an opposition victory, overthrowing the government of Tajikistan (Tajik + Afghan), (3) potential US and European involvement through the Partnership for Peace and the CENTRAZBAT (+US & EUR), and (4) finally the effect of a real peace in both Tajikistan and Afghanistan (Taj. & Afgh. Peace). For details on the calculations of statistics contact the author: jkzartman@msn.com
Economic Vulnerability
Vulnerability defined as border-crossing interactions, exploitable by one state to the detriment of another, or the interruption of which can cause harm, includes all interstate economic relations. The disruption of economic activity in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted from the specialization of Central Asia economies, and their dependence on infrastructure linkages of power lines, railroads, pipelines and highways. Definitions of vulnerability used by economists generally require better data than transition economies collect. For example, the closest approximation to import vulnerability would be imports as a percentage of domestic consumption. Yet neither the Central Asian governments, nor international organizations, collect even this general level of information for the essential categories of food, energy and capital. Furthermore, such a measure defines the scale of vulnerability, whereas this study also seeks a geographical distribution. The measures used here include the four categories of economic information available, expressed as a geographical distribution: foreign direct investment, aid, imports and exports.
Foreign Direct Investment
The growth of foreign investment in Central Asia has captured a lot of publicity, yet the amounts remain small.12 Economic vulnerability management through diversification applies not just for trade and for the structure of the economy, but also to sources of direct investment.13
Imports and Exports
Measuring imports and exports reflects the need for strategic imports and the foreign reserves to pay for them. Together they serve as a proxy for national exposure to global conditions. 14 The sensitivity of states to global conditions rises as a function of their interaction with global markets: disruptions cause pain and national loss.15 The lack of buffering mechanisms, strategies or institutions to prevent harm to the home state creates vulnerability.16 States need protections designed to permit the growth benefits of integration with the global economy.17 State policies require costly tradeoffs between increased opportunities for efficiency and growth extracted from international economic relations versus the risks of increased vulnerability. The use of import substitution in pursuit of greater autarky, if pursued exclusively, has generally failed. The so-called four tigers of East Asia--Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong--have shown by dramatic sustained economic growth, an example of escape from the trap of dependency. The example set by their strategies has reduced the appeal of management-by-reduction practices of import substitution or self-sufficiency.
Market Structure
The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed greater global trade access, but this did not reduce vulnerability. Greater trade has the perverse effect of reducing the diversification of the economy as each state concentrates on its comparative advantage.18 The concentration of production into a few products also indicates a scale measurement of economic vulnerability. When a country only exports one or two products, this is a form of captivity to the market that can be measured as export concentration.19 Therefore, managing economic vulnerability requires a balance between efforts to increase the number of trade partners, and resisting pressures toward the increasing concentration of production. Market structure, such as measured by the export concentration index, is an important issue because it leads to misallocation of capital investment, may contribute to corruption and hinder the development of democratization.20 Comparing Uzbekistan with three other Central Asian countries, all four countries show a healthy increase in the number of other countries buying their exports, which indicates successful vulnerability management by dispersion. The scale of vulnerability shows a great difference in outcomes. For Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the scale of their vulnerability continues to decline, as represented by a lowering of their export concentration. However, the structure of exports for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is increasingly concentrated, an increasing vulnerability.
In the face of restrictions posed by geography, market control demands creative and purposeful state policies beyond the obvious strategies of production diversification, infrastructure development, and active marketing. Economic vulnerability necessitates state policy just as much as threats to military capacity.
Identity Vulnerability
To the extent that the competition for resources and influence in Central Asia includes a struggle for ideological reinforcement, concepts of monopoly and vulnerability may also apply in the realm of cultural support for political stability. Even Kenneth Waltz considers the identity dimension, in so far as cultural identity supports political stability and competence.21
Cultural identity defines the terms under which states seek their self-preservation.22 Alignment between the state and the moral commitments of its members fulfills the requirements of legitimacy.23 Social order and legitimacy requirements force the Central Asian states to consider side effects from interstate relations upon all three elements of social order. Global economic relations that bring diverse peoples into closer contact create political consequences. National development in the contemporary academic use of the term includes constituent elements of identity, such as shared history, language, or even religion, but more generally a shared vision of boundaries of belonging. National policies promoted without considering their effects on political identity can lead to instability.24 Societal level analysis of international affairs must consider that international events, agreements and changing relations carry differential effects on subgroups, increasing the potential for friction and fission. Identity vulnerability tries to measure threats to that aspect of political legitimacy expressed as congruence between the style, policies and goals of the state (political culture) and the cultural identity of the people. Because cross-border interactions, and internal conditions, exploitable by outside powers can undermine stability, identity vulnerability is operationalized in two parts, contact access and ethnicity.25
Ethnicity
A few bloody conflicts between ethnic groups accent their heterogeneous ethnic composition and vulnerability to internal disruption by competing identity groups (classified as part of the "cultural dimension"). For example, Kulchik, Fadin and Sergeev rate the prevention of "ethnic-social explosions" as a more significant issue than the replacement of socialism with democracy and capitalism.26 Vulnerability combines perception with durable conditions. For example, some observers talk about the threat from the revolutionary or oppositional potential of political Islam.27 However, state vulnerability is a function of social and economic conditions that make people receptive to the message of political Islam. In the meantime, the political structures being formed in Central Asia reflect the balance between the influence of Islam, ethnicity, nationalism, and kinship ties. The national leaders are exploiting the inability of any one identity to form a politically dominant combination. This allows them to use the materials of collective heritage to create their own distinctive forms of personal leadership.28 Cross-cultural contact indicators include: (1) scheduled airline seating capacity as a proxy for tourists, foreign workers, missionaries, (2) students, (3) media broadcasts and media imports.
Airline Capacity
States often inaugurate regular scheduled airline service to a target country as a symbol of interest and the desire for influence. Regular airline flights provide a channel that involves economic potential as well as cultural exchange and diplomatic reciprocity of recognition.29
Students
The implications of student exchange are well understood by the governments of sending and receiving states. Student exchange does not merely serve the purpose of raising the level of human capital, indirectly a form of technology transfer. Elements of vulnerability underlay the symbolism of student exchange that implies compatibility between states and willingness to cooperate.30
Media Imports
While statistics on the geographical distribution of sources of imported cultural products are elusive, UNESCO figures on the sources of imported long films are used where available. The significance of cultural products and the media is evident from the protests against them made in third world countries.31
Radio
Measurement of cross-cultural contact must include media such as cross-border radio broadcasting. As radio broadcasting functions within the whole structure of cultural production controlled by the government, minority groups perceive its function as a tool of cultural assimilation or conquest.32 In other words, state legitimacy can be affected by media portrayal of government performance as well as by faithfulness in cultural representation.
Vulnerability Management in Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan can be described as seeking to prove and enlarge its independence in transition from Soviet control to demonstrable sovereignty. Part of this independence is freedom of action, reducing the constraints of what other counties may do. Uzbekistan has many advantages over its neighbors. It shares no borders with Russia and has no Russian bases or troops on its soil.33 It has more industry, such as car and aircraft manufacturing capacity, than its neighbors. It is self-sufficient in energy resources and has been able to use a blockade of energy exports as a weapon against its neighbors. This freedom of action, measured according to these proposed indices, can be compared with the condition of its neighbors. Uzbekistan could define a successful policy outcome as an increased freedom of action, or reduced vulnerability, in comparison to its neighbors.
Uzbekistan has acted decisively in response to possibly deteriorating security from Tajikistan.34 Uzbekistan has chosen to define its security as threatened by political Islam and has sought alliances solely for this purpose. Uzbek President Karimov's vehemence against political Islam manifests management by reduction, not dispersal or encapsulation.35 This has required an oppressive control over all political expression and the media. Security and identity have become strongly linked under the same policies. The U. S. and other western governments have essentially acquiesced, under protest, to these policies because the U. S. has also defined political Islam, as a product of Iran, as a threat.
Greater size and resource endowments allowed both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to use controls, such as restrictions on foreign investment and currency non-convertibility, as a management-by-reduction strategy. This strategy reduced the severity of decline during the beginning of post-Soviet economic transition. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan pursued a strategy of dispersion, which involved aggressive economic reform and active efforts, an opening to the global economy to attract increasing numbers of economic transaction partners.36 Economic reform policies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have reduced the scale of the economic vulnerability and improved its distribution, while the scale of Uzbek and Turkmen vulnerability has grown.
Some aspects of the future regional environment can be predicted. Uzbekistan has enjoyed some cushioning from the economic shocks of 1998 that began in Thailand, known as the "Asian Financial Crisis," relative to the more open economies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, if Uzbekistan does not open its economy when global economic conditions improve, it will not benefit as strongly from increasing demand.37 Changes in relative vulnerability between these five republics will alter the political dynamics of interaction. For example, the accumulated and continuing effects of the Russian economic blockade of Turkmenistan, and the emigration of people to their titular republics, will create significant shifts in the factors measured here.
Conclusion
All of this discussion concerns levels of concentration and vulnerability largely relative to those of other members of the regional system. Uzbekistan continues to rely on a management-by-reduction economic policy. When global economic conditions improve, other Central Asian states that are actively "managing-by-dispersion" will gain increased freedom of action. If Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan gain increasing freedom of action, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan lose it, a competition in vulnerability management may set in. It may lead Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to shift their strategies toward seeking a greater number of interaction partners (dispersion) and perhaps to greater regional cooperation.
NOTES
1 Helge Hveem's concise definition refers to the active agents: "Vulnerability is the lack of control over something that is of interest to a party." Helge Hveem, "Responses to Interdependence: International Restructuring, National Vulnerability and the New Protectionism," Edited by James N. Rosenau and Hylke Tromp, Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics, (Brookfield: Avebury, 1989). 140. This means that the primary (vulnerable) party tries to increase its control or decrease its interest in the object in question (resources, access to infrastructure, technology, capital, etc.) or, on the other hand, tries to reduce the control of others or increase their interest in what it controls.
2 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977), 15.
3P. W. Preston, Political/Cultural Identity, (Sage: Thousand Oaks CA, 1997) 88. Referring to Susan Strange, States and Markets, ( London: Pinter, 1988) See also, Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, "Revisiting the 'National': Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism?" The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996) 106. They refer to K. E. Boulding, Ecodynamics, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications 1978).
4The accepted measure of concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirshman (HH) index, calculated as equal to the sum of the squares of the individual factors divided by the square of the total size of the measured dimension. A distribution of 45, 29, 21, 5 yields an HH of .333. It is the inverse of the Laakso-Taagepera effective number (N), which in this example would be 3. Rein Taagepera, "Expansion and Contraction Patterns of Large Polities: Context for Russia," International Studies Quarterly, 41, no. 3, September, 1997, p. 478.
5"Each state exists, in a sense, at the hub of a whole universe of threats. These threats define its insecurity and set the whole agenda for national security as a policy problem." Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina , 1983), 88.
6"National Security Concept of the Russian Federation," (in English) Rossiiskiye Vesti, Dec. 25, 1997. From RIA-Novosti Daily Review, no. 2. [http://www.ria-novosti.com/products/dr/1998/01/09-002-1.htm.] Jan. 9, 1998. See also Bess A Brown, "Security and Military Issues in Central Asia," in State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 237. Brown writes: AThe very real threats to the Central Asian states are internal--primarily, weak economies and the danger of political and social instability. . . . The only threat to the independence of the Central Asian states in the foreseeable future is likely to come from Russia where nationalist and imperialist sentiments are experiencing a rebirth--ironically, the country on which the Central Asians are most dependent for the development of their military establishments." p. 250.
7Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 105. For each dimension the share of the system total is computed in percentage and the three dimensions are added and averaged. The statistics for each dimension are compiled in an appendix as specified: Military--number of personnel and military expenditure; Industrial--production of ingot steel and industrial fuel consumption; Demographic--total population and urban population. For non-contiguous states the national capabilities are deflated for distance by exponentiating the home composite capability of a nation by its logarithm.
8Stuart A. Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965" Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36, no. 2, (June 1992) 327. He concludes that, out of all the suggested factors for increasing war, contiguity yields a probability ". . . thirty-five times greater than the probability of war when contiguity is absent, there can be little doubt that the effect of state-to-state contiguity on the occurrence of war is quite strong."
9"Another way of looking at a country's vulnerability or nonvulnerability is to examine what has been called by geographers 'border pressure.' In considering this one takes into account the number of neighboring countries with which a common border is shared, their relative population ratios, their military strength, and their political intentions. 'Such balances are measures only of potential pressure, but they may give a rough index of 'hidden' feelings of being enclosed and threatened on the part of politicians and even whole peoples.' " Michael Handel. Weak States in the International System, (Totowa, N. J.: Frank Cass, 1981) 75, Quoting Cole, J. P. Geography of World Affairs. 4th Edition. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 378.
10Mark Stenhouse, "Central Asia - A Catalyst for Change," International Defense Review, Jane's Information Group Limited, December 31, 1994, p. 46. NEXIS.
11Uzbek policy has tried to avoid the loss associated with an opposition victory in Tajikistan. According to the framework posited here, an opposition victory would be represented in a sharp security loss-vulnerability increase. This is measured as the shift from 5.67 effective number of partners to 4.53 effective partners. However, Uzbek help did not sufficiently empower the Tajik government to any foreseeable victory over the opposition. This led the Tajik government, in a stratagem for greater Russian help, to call for formal political union with the Russian Federation. The prospects of a political union of Tajikistan and Russia can be described as raising Uzbek security vulnerability to Russian reimperialistic strategies. This increased vulnerability can be captured by adding the Tajik border numbers to the Russian national capability numbers. This raises Uzbekistan's security vulnerability by reducing the concentration from an "effective number of partners" score of 5.67 to 5.2 "effective number of partners." (For "effective number of partners" see p. 6, n. 4).
12The Economic Commission for Europe reports that these five countries "accounted for just one percent of overseas direct investment in the world's developing and transitional economies." "The Central Asian Economies, 1991-1996" Economic Survey of Europe, (Geneva: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1998) p. 33 Despite the inadequacies of information on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) it carries significance for economic vulnerability because, in the words of the IMF Survey: "Foreign Direct Investment, . . . formed nearly half of all capital flows to developing countries in 1997." Foreign Direct investment also exerts significant effects on political stability and promotes technology transfer.
13According to Sergei Kolchin, Kazakhstan exemplifies this policy: "Another distinguishing feature of Kazakhstan's investment policy is the diversity of foreign investors, who come from almost all over the world. In addition to the traditional giants of the oil business, they include Switzerland, China, Canada, Argentina and Indonesia." Sergei Kolchin, "Foreign Investment in Kazakhstan's Oil and Gas Complex," The Jamestown Foundation Prism, III no. 17, part 3, [http://www.jamestown.org], October 24, 1997, p. 2.
14Compared to security and identity vulnerability, most countries interact economically with a much greater number of partners. The constraints on a greater dispersion in the number of trade partners and products reflect the degree to which economics is constrained by geography (as is security) and by past history (as is identity). Historical constraints in this context refer to the heritage of Soviet polices which imposes multiple barriers between the Central Asian economies and their economic self-determination.
15"Since the system is addictive, in the sense that states must restructure themselves extensively in order to participate in it, once such restructuring has occurred states increase their vulnerability to adverse behavior by others, or to breakdowns in the system." Barry Buzan, People States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, (University of North Carolina: Chapel Hill, 1983), 144. Events in Malaysia and Indonesia in 1998 illustrate the power of this system to force a measure of conformity of practice that states treat as an assault on their sovereignty. As Crawford explains: "There is little question that, even from a liberal perspective, participation in the market increases the number of economic vulnerabilities a state faces." Crawford, 9 "Where such complex patterns of interdependence exist, many states will be vulnerable to disruptions in the pattern of trade."
16As Ricardo Hausmann argues: "To make today's globalized, volatile capitalism sustainable, governments need to develop strategies and institutions that reduce the range of economic swings and better absorb major shocks. Ricardo Hausmann, "Will Volatility Kill Market Democracy?" Foreign Policy, 108 (Fall 1997) p. 54-67. Quotes taken from page 55. Emphasis added.
17"Policies to reduce vulnerability in trade relations rub against the imperatives of the marketplace. Trade theoretically enhances the capabilities of all trading partners and facilitates a division of labor in which dependencies thrive." Crawford, 5.
18A standard text by Appleyard and Feld notes: ". . . there is no doubt that trade moves production in all countries toward a more specialized production pattern than would be the case in autarky." Dennis R Appleyard and Alfred J. Field, Jr. International Economics Trade Theory and Policy, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Irwin, 1995), 32.
19This study uses the same method as used by the World Bank in computing export concentration. In the World Development Report 1996, pp. 192, 193, Table 3, 2nd column. No figures were given for the five states of Central Asia, but the scale ranged from a high of 0.934 for Nigeria on the high end to 0.076 ---China, 0.056 -- Italy and 0.080 for the U. S. as the three lowest. (New York: Oxford University Press, World Bank, 1996). The 1997 edition did not include this category of information.
20As David Nissman observes: "Concentration of control of a plum asset mainly sold abroad --oil-- invites corruption and discourages the requisite transparency." David Nissman, RFE/RL, April 3,1998. Reprinted in Turkistan Newsletter 98-2:065 [Turkistan-N@VM.EGE.TR], April 9, 1998. The deleterious effects on the potential for the decentralization of political power are also persuasively explained by Ali Abootalebi: "The more resources the state controls and the more independent the state elites are from the other socioeconomic classes, the more likely an authoritarian regime will take hold." Ali R. Abootalebi, "Civil Society, Democracy, and the Middle East" Middle East Review of International Affairs, Volume 2, no. 2, [www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria.html//], September 24, 1998, referencing the work Capitalist Development and Democracy, by Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens.
21While economics and military capability may be considered self-explanatory categories for measuring power, Waltz includes the realm of political stability, a product and function of "political legitimacy." In Theory of International Politics, Waltz insists that states cannot be considered powerful merely for capabilities within one category, such as military, economics, or size of population, but lacking in others. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 131.
22Glen Fisher describes the need for security of identity that drives all states: "National identity and pride, a sense of place in history, popular beliefs about the role that one's nation plays on the world scene--all have major consequences for the international process." Glen Fisher, Mindsets, 2nd edition (Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press, 1997), p. 75
23Brenda Creasey defines the requirements of social order: "All forms of social order possess coercive elements [police], 'utilitarian' elements [economic incentives], and normative elements [appeals to values and moral education]." Brenda Creasey, Personal Communication.
24Merdad Haghayeghi explains, the future development of these states will not be shaped by competition between Iran, Turkey, the West and Russia, as states, but between competing complexes of identity. Identity is one dimension of stability and of sovereignty which states act to protect from influence by external agents. "In this process, Islam, democracy, and ethnicity are the principle players in the Central Asian drama, whose script has yet to assume its final shape." Mehrdad Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), xv. Shireen Hunter also explains: "Despite early fears about a regional struggle in Central Asia, especially between Iran and Turkey, that could lead to domination by one of them, . . . . In fact most of the regional countries, except for Tajikistan, have skillfully manipulated competition for influence in the region to their own advantage." Hunter, p. xix
25The vulnerability of the Central Asian republics is a product of the interest attracted to these states because of their geopolitical setting, their resources and the characteristics of the population that make linkages on the basis of shared identity exploitable. "This attention has rendered the republics vulnerable to systemic influences. . . . Because developments in Central Asia would inevitably affect the interests of these actors, they have tried to influence the internal evolution of the Central Asian countries and their foreign policies by encouraging specific ideological tendencies. . . . Their interference has tended to exacerbate the Central Asian countries' internal divisions and intensify differences and rivalries." Shireen T. Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence. The Washington Papers/168, (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1996), 17.
26"The situation in Central Asia is much more complicated and dramatic than that (a confrontation between post-Communist regimes and democratic opposition forces): the key item on its agenda is not the introduction of Western-style democratic procedures as in Russia but in the prevention of an ethnic-social explosion of immense power which will call into question the very survival of local societies." Yuriy Kulchik, Andrey Fadin and Victor Sergeev, Central Asia After Empire, Transnational Institute, (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1996) 27.
27"It is the availability of such Islamic doctrines to the Central Asian republics that has greatly contributed to an overall uncertainty with regard to the future political development of these newly independent states." Mehrdad Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995) p. xviii.
28Bess Brown explains: "One of the first tasks of the political and intellectual elite of post-independence Central Asia has been the promotion of national patriotism in place of the local or clan loyalties that traditionally have dominated the region." Bess A. Brown, "National Security and Military Issues in Central Asia," 235. Igor Lipovsky describes the general process of national identity creation used in Central Asia as an eclectic borrowing from different periods of Turkish history. The ingredients include controlled democracy, an economy half liberal and the other half state-owned, and an ideological appeal blending both nationalistic and Islamic values. "This eclectic model allows the Central Asian leaders to retain the structure of power and methods of leadership of the old communist regime, while making a smooth transition to a moderate, secular, nationalist political system, with a mixed economy." Igor Lipovsky, "Central Asia: In Search of a New Political Identity," Middle East Journal. 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996) 214.
29The availability of seating capacity statistics for the four Turkic airports, (Almaty, Ashghabat, Bishkek, and Tashkent) allows their use here to support a geographical distribution. This does not, therefore, make any claim about who is in any aircraft seat in terms of the threat they may pose, but only about the capacity as a component in the distribution of vulnerability.
30The study by UNESCO concerning this function of culture carrying, concluded that: "The foreign student has come in order to be affected by his stay. Culture carrying to him and through him is legitimate, and required, the raison d'etre of his stay. Students as Links Between Cultures, edited by Ingrid Eidde (Oslo: UNESCO and the International Peace Research Institute, 1979), 179.
31"Globalization has economic roots and political consequences, but it has also brought into focus the power of culture in this global environment--the power to bind and to divide in a time when the tensions between integration and separation tug at every issue that is relevant to international relations. The impact of globalization on culture and the impact of culture on globalization merit discussion." David Rothkopf, "In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?" in Foreign Affairs Vol. 107, Summer 1997, p. 39. See also Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld.
32Ayaz Malikov, "The Question of the Turk: The Way Out of the Crisis" (Translated by Audrey L. Altstadt) Published in H. B. Paksoy, Ed., Central Asia Reader: The Rediscovery of History, (New York/London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).
33Discussion of national vulnerabilities in Uzbekistan always plays against the background of Russian proximity, power, levers of influence, control over infrastructure and recent historical domination. Proximity to such a preponderance of power constitutes a self-evident vulnerability to Russian influence or interference.
34First, Uzbekistan reacted to potential changes in political configuration in Tajikistan that would have increased its concentration of security vulnerability. Uzbekistan exploited its leverage over regions of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to achieve these purposes. The factor which led to Uzbek action was a prospective change in the concentration of vulnerability, not the magnitude. Rising security vulnerability led to the first Uzbek policy change. The increase in security vulnerability did not arise from growing national capabilities of neighboring states (changing scale), but from changing political configurations that reduced the distribution of security vulnerability. The increases in the concentration of security vulnerability forced policy changes. Uzbekistan interferes with the political settlement of the civil war in Tajikistan as a method of vulnerability management. Uzbek security vulnerability that is more diffuse than its neighbors, together with greater national capabilities, enable this policy. High Uzbek capabilities relative to Tajikistan allowed President Karimov to force the Tajik government to negotiate with the opposition. Since then, the negotiated peace settlement between the Tajik government and the opposition has obviated any Tajik union with the Russian Federation, now Uzbek policy has reverted to support for the government against the opposition.
35Beverly Crawford offers two common strategies of vulnerability management. The first is reduction by force of policy, presumably along the lines of Helge Hveem's four strategic options, (see page 11). The second is the transcending (encapsulating) of vulnerability through the organization of regional economic and security cooperative agreements and alliances. She writes: "States can reduce their trade vulnerability by changing their own policies to diminish the power their partner gains within the relationship. They can also minimize their vulnerability by building international "regimes" that establish norms of reciprocity and rules and procedures to determine who controls markets and to limit the power trading partners can exercise over one another." Beverly Crawford, Economic Vulnerability in International Relations: The Case of East-West Trade, Investment and Finance, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 47.
36In particular, Kazakhstan's aggressive dispersion of its relations with investing countries helped protect the government from the threats experienced by Kyrgyzstan. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has set up a scale to measure progress to a market economy. This scale from 1 to 4 covers enterprises, markets, financial institutions and legal transition. The EBRD has rated Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan a 2.75, Uzbekistan at 2.2 and Tajikistan and Turkmenistan at the bottom with 1.5. Transition Report 1997, (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1997), 21
37Excessively rigid controls reduce investment trade and growth but can throwback the crashing waves of a regional financial crisis. For example, Rostam Kavoussi has found that growth is a function both of outward orientation and external demand. During cyclical periods of low external demand, external orientation may cost more than it benefits. Rostam M. Kavoussi, "International Trade and Economic Development: The Recent Experience of Developing Countries," The Journal of Developing Areas, 19 (April 1985) 379-392 Excessively rigid controls reduce investment trade and growth but can throwback the crashing waves of a regional financial crisis. For example, Rostam Kavoussi has found that growth is a function both of outward orientation and external demand. During cyclical periods of low external demand, external orientation may cost more than it benefits. Rostam M. Kavoussi, "International Trade and Economic Development: The Recent Experience of Developing Countries," The Journal of Developing Areas, 19 (April 1985) 379-392
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