|
and Competing Conflict Resolution Theories
By
Jonathan Zartman
Paper Presented at
Association for the Study of Nationalities
8th Annual Convention April 3-5, 2003
Columbia University
15th Floor International Affairs Building
420 W. 118th St.
New York City, New York
Panel V.7 (Friday: 11:15-1:15)
Comparative Analyses of Conflict and Conflict Resolution
Abstract
The consolidation of peace during the five years after negotiations ended the civil war in Tajikistan provides support for a social constructivist approach to conflict resolution. A comparison of theoretical perspectives in the fields of identity politics, social movements, conflict and conflict resolution reveals the importance of connecting social constructivism with a corresponding conflict resolution methodology. The observations of negotiators, that changes in thinking precede formal arrangements in mediations, support the constructivist position on the negotiated and instrumental character of identities and interests. Tajikistan offers an example of the successful application of the "Sustained Dialogue" methodology, consistent with the social constructivist standpoint. Because this process incorporated a model for creating civil society, it enabled a society-changing process, making sustainable peace possible. Tajikistan's experience with Sustained Dialogue shows the significance of social constructivism and provides an example for other post-conflict states.
The Tajik civil war ended in June 1997 with a peace agreement between the "neo-communist" government and a diverse coalition of democrats, nationalists and Islamists. Since then, stability and security have increased and the prospects for state-society consolidation continue to improve. The success of the Tajik Peace agreement, compared to the historical record of difficulty in resolving civil wars in general, represents an unusual situation that deserves study.1 Sustained peace after a negotiated settlement is unusual for any country to achieve. In four other former Soviet areas—Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) and Chechnya--hostilities only led to military stalemate with de facto secession or continued conflict. Research shows that of 91 civil wars between 1945 and 1993, only 12 ended by negotiation and of these, only six did not fall back into war in the five years following.
Thus, Tajikistan provides a case where the state suffered a period of sustained conflict and has now also achieved five years of increasing peace and stability. The literature on the Tajik civil war consists mostly of a debate between the ideological explanation of democrats-nationalist-Islamists vs. the conservative old-guard ex-Communists and the clan warfare explanation of a Gharmi/Pamiri insurrection against the Khujandi-Kulobi alliance. The few authors who attempt to surmount this dichotomy, such as Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, propose a "pure politics" model with concepts like "competition for shares of a larger pie" or the "rush to fill a power vacuum."3 Because all of these elements were involved at different times and in different intensities, efforts to promote one image at the expense of another seem both atheoretical and unsatisfying.
To understand the political dynamics of this process it is useful to compare the relevance of competing theoretical perspectives. For example, the literature on ethnicity and nationalism contains three competing perspectives on cultural identity -- rational choice, primordialism, and social constructivism. In contrast, even recent writing on civil wars (e.g., The Journal of Conflict Resolution, February 2002) shows a debate primarily between only two perspectives--the relative role of greed versus grievance. The conflict resolution literature also gives little attention to perspectives other than rational instrumentalism or "Basic Human Needs." Deficiencies like these lead Collier and Sambanis (2002) to conclude that analysis and theoretical development are lacking.4
I shall discuss the relevance of three competing perspectives, or frameworks, and extract general statements by which to test their explanations of sustained peace. After presenting an overview of the theoretical perspectives, I present four related arguments. First, although lack of data prohibits formal hypothesis testing of each model's explanations for durable peace, the motivations and sources of aid received by the government and the opposition demonstrate the value of a framing model, or social constructivist, explanation. Second, Tajikistan represents a case of peace as a political accomplishment. Third, the nature of the "Sustained Dialogue" intervention in Tajikistan contributed to this durable peace. Fourth, sustained dialogue is compatible with the social constructivist perspective..5 Therefore, social constructivism represents an important explanation of durable peace.
Rational-Instrumentalism—The Greed Model
According to the rational choice perspective, individuals with stable, forward-looking preferences economize in pursuing their goals; they attempt to maximize their "expected utility." However, many analyses do not use the strict assumptions and mathematical equations of formal rational choice models, so this approach will be called merely "rational-instrumentalism." In international relations, the rational choice perspective explains war as the product of a calculation by an initiating state, which predicts it will win, and the expected benefits will outweigh the costs..6 Conflict results from the difficulties of measuring power, from miscalculation or from the degree of uncertainty. According to rational choice explanations, greed motivates a group to attack or oppress the people in other groups whenever they have an opportunity, causing civil wars. If only greed and opportunity cause civil wars, then raising the cost of violence with a counterbalancing threat or force can deter them.7
In the rational-instrumental explanation of social movements, leaders utilize pre-existing organizational resources to mobilize people to demonstrate.8 According to this "resource mobilization theory" a successful social movement requires organizational skills to define propaganda, to manage goal setting, to handle the logistics of mobilizing crowds, and to recruit new members. Resource mobilization theory describes how recruits estimate the costs and benefits of participation and how leaders exploit their existing relationships and organizations and calculate when planning strategy.
A rational-instrumental approach to conflict resolution (hereafter called the "Greed Model") expects peace negotiations to occur at a "ripe moment" when both parties perceive a "hurting stalemate.".9 Successful conflict resolution requires finding a "split the difference" or 50% solution.10 In summary, people create conflicts when they seek their self-interest (greed and looting) or become fearful (security dilemma).11 The rational choice assumption that interests are fixed leads to a strategy of seeking the right formula in terms of a constitution that meets the core interests of each side. Forms of external intervention to resolve a conflict include economic aid to reward cease-fire observance, or military aid to the weaker party as well as peacekeepers (hereafter referred to as "monitoring").
Rational instrumentalists believe that conflict can be resolved by overcoming the security dilemma. As Barbara Walter has expressed it, two parties cannot resolve their conflict without third party intervention because they cannot make credible commitments.12 When peacekeepers intervene they provide reassurance by allowing each side to monitor the offensive capabilities of the other side. Conflict resolution does not require that either party understand the grievances of the other, but only that the structure of incentives does not reward fighting. Reliance on incentives to encourage compromise makes agreements fragile. They can collapse if they do not evolve into resilient political processes..13 Conflict resolution methodology based on rational instrumental logic does not reliably produce sustainable peace because, unless there are changes in identity and interests, then monitoring and incentives can fail when external parties lose credibility, interest or capacity. More sophisticated approaches seek to help contending parties to reframe their dispute to identify those shared interests in a resolution from which both can gain, thereby modifying the zero-sum character of the conflict.14
Rational-Instrumentalism and Durable Peace
Explanations of durable peace must address the question "To what extent do present conditions represent a satisfactory compromise among parties motivated by fear and greed?" For example, the economic explanation (greed model) of the Tajik civil war settlement claims that the opposition was not motivated by ideology but by the pursuit of money. Statements from NGO directors and local political observers support this argument.15 For example, people in Dushanbe interpret the large number of conspicuously expensive houses belonging to the customs police as an indication that the opposition leaders continue to accept the civil war settlement because they are content with control over certain sections of the border and the flow of drugs.16 However, the record of negotiations shows that ideological and security concerns both competed for importance, but there is no evidence that material factors played a role in achieving settlement. Furthermore, newspaper articles report the large role of Russian troops and the participation of government (not former opposition) officials in the drug trade. According to popular interpretation, the Deputy Minister of Justice, (former opposition member) was assassinated for his aggressive investigation and prosecution of corruption and drug dealing. There is little indication that the opposition agreed to peace just to legitimize control of drug routes.17
Primordialism—The Grievance Model
In contrast to the rational choice perspective, which takes interests as fixed and ignores particular identities, the opposite view is often called primordialism. Primordialism explains identity as attachment or loyalty to the group that individuals enter at birth. Therefore, identity is defined in terms not only of language, religion, and culture, but more importantly of blood ties and region of origin.18 The concept of identity as a basic human psychological need explains the strength and also the enduring nature of loyalty to one's cultural identity. Therefore, groups separated by the greatest differences in culture, or "cultural distance" should suffer the strongest conflict.19
Primordialism emphasizes those qualities missing from the rational choice perspective, such as the social, cultural and emotional character of identity. Academic writers still emphasize the role of cultural-identity, and some elements of "group identity orientation" such as "expressive logic," in contrast to instrumental logic. It remains significant as a form of discourse used effectively by elites their struggle to mobilize their people.20 It formed the basis of Soviet nationality policy, and it still forms the basis for US policy in many areas.21 Journalists frequently use images of primordial conflict, however, even when it is used to explain the emotional power of an ethnic conflict, it fails to explain how some groups can live together peacefully for long periods of time before erupting into violence.
Academic explanations of identity reject primordialism as descriptively inaccurate, and for its role as a basis of policy. For example, John Schoeberlein's seminal dissertation on identity highlights the weakness of the terms "Uzbek" and "Tajik" as descriptions of bounded units of meaning.22 He demonstrates this using evidence of changing identities, transitional forms of identity and by noting how people describe themselves. The tendency toward ethnic conflict unleashed when states define themselves in terms of primordial qualities rather than by civic nationalism also brings disrepute on primordialism.23
In the social mobilization literature, a corresponding perspective called "Breakdown Theory" claims that any sign of weakening central control will allow grievances or group antagonisms to explode in a spontaneous display of violence. In the conflict resolution literature, John Burton's concept of "basic human needs" offers a similar perspective because, among many causes of conflict, he emphasizes demands from groups seeking redress for their grievances and recognition of their culture and identity. He takes culture as a fixed and given quality.24 According to this approach (hereafter called the "Grievance Model"), depriving people of their basic human needs for security, identity, and recognition produces violence where political control and the provision of social services are weakest.
Conflict resolution under the "Primordialism/Basic Human Needs" framework requires that third parties intervene to supply these needs and help the conflicting parties to grant each other recognition and security.25 To achieve this aim, Burton advocates "problem-solving workshops" to help people from both sides, working in small discussion groups, to understand the grievances of the other. In practice, these workshops have been one-time events lasting perhaps two to six weeks. They are vulnerable to the criticism that participants return quickly to their pre-existing attitudes after the workshop concludes. Both greed and grievance models explain the potential for conflict in terms of motive forces and they take the existence of opposition as a given. Therefore, conflict is a product of a change in the strength and resources of forces motivating the opposition and a change in the flow of resources to the established order.
Primordialism and Durable Peace
Explanations of durable peace must address the question, "To what extent do present conditions represent the transition from an oppressive, socially unresponsive state (communism) to the recognition and protection of minority rights and social freedom?" For example, the primordialist (grievance) model of the Tajik civil war settlement claims that the opposition was motivated solely by the need for the protection and recognition of indigenous Tajik culture through democracy. Evidence in support of this proposition includes the observation that the present regime has begun promoting a nationalist ideology and claims to seek democratization. These new policies satisfy the demands originally presented by the opposition; therefore, peace is durable because grievances have been mollified. However, the reports by human rights monitoring organizations still record significant problems, particularly in the area of institutionalizing political freedom and the rule of law. Therefore, this explanation seems weak.
Social Constructivism—The Framing Model
Social constructivism emphasizes the collective construction of self-image, the processes by which opposition develops and the manner in which identities and interests can change.27 Social constructivism does not consider conflict solely the product of competition between groups with fixed identities or interests; identities, interests and institutions all play a role in driving outcomes.27 The social constructivist perspective emphasizes that all three elements-- culture, context and political choices--are required for a complete explanation of any phenomenon. While rational choice ignores culture, primordialism gives culture a structural function, which in its strong form determines action. The stark contrast between rational choice and primordialism supports efforts to transcend this opposition by specifying the conditions under which cultural-identity can exert influence on behavior.28 Social constructivism synthesizes the ideas of instrumental-rationality with culture, specifying relations between identity and the operation of interest, strategy and politics, and the conditions under which cultural identity influences behavior.29 The multi-step logical sequential development of cultural-identity, as a function of social and political action, is important in this perspective.30
In conflict resolution literature, the sustainability of a peace-agreement has become associated with peacebuilding. Since the 1990s this term has received attention stimulated by U. N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 An Agenda for Peace.31 After that publication, the concept of building a sustainable peace developed into an understanding that peacebuilding necessitates not just a change in the power and incentive structures, or even of political institutions, but also requires reconstructing the complex and interdependent roles, relations and activities of functional social relationships. In this regard, the advice of those who treat either identities or interests as fixed seems sterile compared to the requirements of peacebuilding.32 Instead, it is social constructivism that fulfills these requirements.33
The conflict resolution literature lacks a well-defined social constructivist prescription. Although John Paul Lederach and Harold Saunders do not advertise their strategies under the label "social-constructivist," their methods represent a compatible approach.34 Lederach and Saunders do not discount the value of incentive-based negotiations, however they do advocate recruiting a small group of people from a specific social stratum to participate in a repeating series of structured and guided "dialogues."35 This practice differs from "workshop" strategies in the type of people recruited and the commitment that they make to the extended set of meetings. For example, Saunders does not merely conduct seminars for teaching "principles." The participants are selected from a middle stratum that is able to influence both leaders and the general population and participants keep their discussions and their identities confidential.
Social Constructivism and Durable Peace
Explanations of durable peace must address the question, "To what extent do present conditions represent the transition from a society split by sharp conflict between the state and numerous regional factions to conditions of reconciliation among regions and between state and society?" For example, the social constructivist (framing) model of the Tajik civil war settlement claims that the opposition was motivated solely by the need to unify the nation. Evidence in support of this position includes the observation that representatives of the state and of a growing civil society now widely employ the same discourse of reconciliation.
Tarrow's concept of "framing," an interpretive scheme by which individuals label and identify events, assign values, and establish dominant issues and terms of reference, is one way to operationalize social constructivism.36 Under this concept, conflict is a function of competing frames that appeal to and define identities and interests within the limits set by preceding choices, culture and power context. The utility of these three perspectives can be measured by comparing their predictions with the sources and motivations under which each party secured external aid. From the following description, the framing model provides a more plausible explanation of the conflict.
For example, the Tajik opposition did not receive external support based on the flow of resources or security fears, a process that would have supported the greed model. External support based upon shared ideology and ethnicity would support the grievance model. However, the opposition failed to receive meaningful aid based on Persian ethnicity from Iran and did not receive any aid based on the ideology of democratization. The only help the opposition received was non-governmental aid channeled from Islamic foundations in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan through the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan. Even in this case the role of ethnicity was less significant than the heavy representation in northern Afghanistan of descendents of previous generations of refugees from conflict in the Soviet Union (Basmachi). During the Soviet invasion, Tajik conscripts were sent to Afghanistan where they established a community of common cause with Afghan Tajiks. When the Popular Front massacred Gharmis in Qurghan-teppe, in the name of restoring the old Communist order, thousands escaped to Afghanistan. Their cause became linked to that of the Afghan Islamic resistance to Soviet aggression. It is therefore ironic that democrats and nationalists in the UTO failed to create a frame that would bring in outside support, while the little support received by any of the opposition coalition came as a result of the Popular Front violence.
In general, the opposition was dependent on the social position and resources of the intelligentsia, which supports the framing model. On the other hand, the government received aid from allies, ostensibly based on security fears, but also to prevent migration flows. If this were the predominant explanation, it would support the greed model. However, the framing model describes the Central Asian leadership as using the image of a resurgent, politically active Islam as a powerful tool to secure external support, regardless of any objective, rational calculation of the capacity, policy position or motivation of opposition social activists. This image resonated with the leadership of the USSR, then with the successor Russian leadership, with the West, especially the US, and was successful in securing active combat intervention and continued protection through Russian border troops. Even though government defenders use a "security threat" concept to justify the government's behavior, the greed model fails to explain the behavior of the opposition, which undercuts its value for the whole conflict matrix. Now, in spite of the military dominance of the government, the democratic-nationalist "frame" of the opposition has finally been accepted as the worldview or model for state-society relations.
The Political Accomplishment of Peace
Journalistic descriptions of Tajikistan invariably call the country "war-torn" and imply that wartime conditions still prevail. Various assassinations, bombings, reports of attacks on police and armed forces and small-scale incursions, have seemed to cast doubt on claims that the Peace Agreement represents the start of sustained peace. Without disregarding in any way the grievous nature of such events, or the ongoing suffering and destruction from the war, several observations indicate that the peace agreement represents an event that needs explaining.37 These observations include the arguments of former opposition leaders, the public reaction to a small insurrection in July 2001, the government's portrayal of the peace agreement, and the tone of city life in Dushanbe.
First, visitors to Dushanbe and Leninabod find conditions are as secure as in many American neighborhoods. Second, according to the official ideology, by reaching an agreement with Islamists and bringing them into the government, the Peace Agreement demonstrates that Tajiks have learned how to negotiate, have gained political maturity, and therefore their experiences are an example to the world.38 The claim of the government that their association with the Islamists demonstrates their superior political virtues is one of several indications that styles of thinking have changed.
Even though leaders on the "government" or "neo-communist" side are tempted to blame the Islamists for the civil war, official pronouncements tend to emphasize the role of external interference and the influence of the civil war in Afghanistan.39 The latest elections for Parliament and President were deeply flawed. However, in spite of the dissolution of the former opposition coalition, so that their supporters lack the capacity to coerce implementation of the agreement, the government is still largely honoring the concessions extended.
Third, although some former opposition leaders have been fired from positions they received in peace negotiations, opposition leaders in general do not take this as a violation of the Peace Agreement. The provision of the peace agreement allocating thirty percent of significant government posts to the opposition only applied to the transition period until the election of a new parliament. Former opposition leaders report that all those who have performed their functions competently have retained their positions and that former opposition members in the second and third tier still represent thirty percent of the government.
In support of this position, an analysis of the biographies of 145 public and political figures in Tajikistan based on Saodat Olimova and Musaffer Olimov, Tajikistan on a Threshold of Changes, (Moscow 1999) shows that 37 percent of the government officials are former UTO members. The following chart is based on analysis of the backgrounds of 12 leading members of the presidential administration, 81 in the government, 20 in the Parliament, 11 Ambassadors and 4 in the Judiciary.40
|
Recruitment channel
|
Presidential Administration |
Government
|
Majlisi-Oli |
Bankers and business leaders |
Overall
|
|
Soviet nomenklatura
|
50.0
|
11.1
|
25
|
0
|
18.6
|
|
Nomenklatura career |
33.4 |
28.4
|
25 |
23.5 |
29.0 |
|
Scientific |
8.3 |
3.7 |
20 |
0 |
6.9 |
|
Military |
8.3 |
7.4 |
0 |
0 |
4.8 |
|
Legislative |
0 |
3.7 |
0 |
70.6 |
10.3 |
|
UTO |
0 |
37.0 |
20 |
5.9 |
24.1 |
|
Other |
0 |
8.7 |
10 |
0 |
6.3 |
|
.0 |
.0 |
|
.0 |
.0 |
Leaders of the former opposition who now work at high levels of the government claim that they are not marginalized, have not "sold-out" their convictions, but rather they are able to effectively engage the policymaking process. They report an internal process of debate and compromise on government policy in which their views are represented and sometimes prevail. This signifies an important change in thinking. Furthermore, the government does correct itself. For example, a young lawyer working in the justice department submitted a memo to the President citing specific clauses in the constitution and the existing laws contradicting a recent presidential decree. The President investigated, discovered that the young man was correct and he revised his earlier decree.
Fourth, the public reacted to an insurrection in late June 2001 by regarding it as a symbolic last rebellion, which in its defeat signaled the triumph of the government in ensuring the safety and stability of the people.41 Right after the government crushed Rakhmon Sanginov's rebellion, during a previously scheduled concert in the park near the Opera and Ballet Theater, the Mayor of Dushanbe spoke claiming that this was the beginning of greater security and now people could feel safe being out late at night.42 The government has reported other shootouts and successful confrontations with remnants of this same gang on July 7 and July 20, and other political assassinations have followed. However, the expression by many people that a point of victory of peace and security over the residual forces from the civil war had been reached is another sign that security conditions are improving. For some observers, the cooperation of army units composed of former opposition fighters with their erstwhile enemies--Popular Front fighters-- in suppressing the rebellions of Colonel Mahmud Khudoiberdiyev also indicate progress toward stability.
Since these observations, in part, illustrate that the Peace Agreement in Tajikistan has laid a foundation for a sustainable peace, this merits study of the process by which it developed.43 Although neighboring states served as guarantors of the peace agreement, provided ideas and exerted pressure on both sides to settle, that is not enough to explain the consolidation of peace. Even though the UN played a substantial role in the Tajik peace agreement negotiations, the broad record of UN activity does not permit giving the UN and its personnel sole credit.44 In addition to the efforts of neighboring states and the UN, there was another form of outside intervention that deserves consideration for its contribution to the character of the peace created through the Inter-Tajik Peace Negotiations. This intervention was the joint Russian-American Dartmouth Conference "Sustained Dialogue" program, which is described in the book A Public Peace Process by Harold Saunders. It preceded and accompanied the formal UN mediated negotiations of the Tajik Peace Agreement.
Although social constructivism encompasses a broad range of discursive strategies, a test of the utility of this perspective depends on perception analysis, the effort to determine how the perceptions of policy makers have changed. This is supremely relevant to conflict resolution because a number of scholars have noted that in successful negotiations to end an intractable civil war, identities and interests do not remain fixed. In some descriptions, during negotiations individuals gain another layer of identity, gain new interests or redefine their interests.45 As Joseph Folger expresses it, " . . . only recently have practitioners and researchers begun to entertain the possibility that mediations may change the parties as well as their situations.46 Marc Howard Ross emphasizes that changes in thinking must first occur in order that groups can believe formal arrangements are actually possible.47
A Public Peace Process
Harold Saunders believes that social relationships can be transformed through continuous interaction and sustained dialogue by citizens outside of government. The transformation of social relationships is not contemplated by the rational choice perspective, but has some compatibility with Burton's "Basic Human Needs" approach. He claims that his intervention represents " . . . the most intensive testing ground for developing and refining the two-part strategy. For that reason, it is the best current case for demonstrating how this strategy for managing conflict in divided societies works."48 Given such a claim and the success of the peace agreement, it is worth examining what this methodology represents and how it fits in with theories of conflict resolution.
Saunder's term "public peace process" means the activity of citizens, ideally interacting on many levels, outside of government, separate from formal mediation or negotiations by governments. He believes that, at its best, this can complement, support and even energize the official process. His methodology helps participants create a shared meaning of what their societies should become so that they become full partners with governments, even compelling governments to work with them when necessary. His term "redefining politics" means not just reforming government, but also more importantly putting a responsible public of active citizens into politics. When a public peace process is successful, the participants work outside of their dialogue meeting to create civil society.
Promotion of a "Sustained Dialogue" does not constitute an attempt to supplant formal negotiations or the formal struggle over the issues of power, security and policy. Instead, dialogue affects the character of the peace produced to improve its sustainability. Sustained Dialogue is different from negotiation because of its focus on changing relationships rather than on choosing a policy direction or dividing material goods or power. It is structured to provide an experience within the dialogue group so that the group can design a plan for changing relationships in the larger community. The goal is to create a sense of the kind of community that antagonists would like to build together to serve the interests of each.
Saunders describes the consequence of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, which began in March 1993 in Moscow and met every two to four months thereafter.
By working to get into the minds, interests and feelings of others, each participant changes . . .. [T]he parties come to define their interests as what they can live with—not their optimal interests—in order to reach the cooperation with others necessary to achieve what all parties absolutely need.49
He cautions, "No participant gives up her or his identity, but each recognizes enough of the other's valid human claims that he or she will act differently toward the other."50 Although Saunders is modest about what can actually be claimed for consequences from this effort, the evidence appears significant. For example, shortly after members of the informal sustained dialogue came to agreement on possible solutions to various problems, both sides in the formal UN moderated negotiations changed their strategy and positions toward that solution.
After Dialogue 5, an envoy of the UN Secretary General arranged for a first round of negotiations in April, which included two dialogue members on the opposition team and one on the government team. Although no direct cause and effect can be proven, he notes, "Participants in the government decision to negotiate and U. N. officials credited the work of the Dialogue with having played a significant role.".51
Another early example is the joint production by the dialogue participants of a finished paper, "Memorandum on a Negotiating Process in Tajikistan." The pride that participants took in jointly producing this statement proves that the group members had moved into a new way of thinking.52 Because of the many different people and factors at play in a complex interaction, the degree of influence cannot be proved, but he notes, "[opposition] members said [this memorandum] served as a guide for the opposition's approach."52
As a result of the negotiations, all parties agreed that in the future Tajikistan must be "united, secular, democratic and peaceful." To the same extent that the Islamists have had to accept "secular," the government leaders have had to accept "democratic," in spite of their orientation or preferences to monopolize power, or Tajikistan would never become either united or peaceful. In this process, democrats and nationalists were able to mediate between these opposing camps and their interpretation of cultural-identity prevailed. Their vision of a democratic and tolerant Tajikistan as the fulfillment of the historical character of Tajiks has become embodied in the official interpretation of national symbols.54 According to these descriptions, sustained dialogue contributed to the resolution of the Tajik conflict by facilitating the ongoing process of socially constructing a transformation of Tajik society.
Social constructivism does not claim that culture can function independently from the exercise of power or from the pursuit of economic prosperity.55 For this reason, Pierre Bourdieu's concept of "relative cultural autonomy" –as a consequence of historical processes—provides a useful organizing concept.56 Bourdieu listed three conditions for the relative autonomy of culture, 1) state supported universities and a media free from totalitarian control, 2) a differentiated society in which intellectuals can market their services and 3) a supportive regional base or faction of society.
Under the conditions of peace negotiations, the relative freedom of speech and activity, or "cultural autonomy" of intellectuals increased. In Tajikistan a remarkable number of nongovernmental organizations have been formed as a result of the Sustained Dialogue to address community needs, with the support and encouragement of the international community. The autonomy of the producers of culture has increased through their creation of civil society associations, which have both served social needs and drawn a larger proportion of society into finding ways to solve problems collectively. Democrats and nationalists gained greater influence because their interpretation of the Tajik symbolic heritage met a recognized need. Islamists and those holding "neo-communist" preferences have adapted to changing social conditions.
The future material well being of Tajikistan will require state-led policies of economic promotion in order to gain foreign investment, which in turn depend on the sustained consolidation of social order. Tajikistan's experience with Sustained Dialogue is useful to show the significance of social constructivism and provides an example of peacebuilding in a multi-ethnic, post-conflict developing country context. Therefore, any lessons from Tajikistan would offer insight for other post-conflict states.57
NOTES
1 Measurements of the rarity of sustained peace from a negotiated settlement of a civil war vary according to the database employed. For example, Hugh Miall writes, "The categories of conflict involving secession, religion and struggles for control of government included no peacefully resolved cases." A much higher measurement of success comes from Doyle and Sambanis, who cite 65.32% are strict failures and 34.68% successes. According to Roy Licklider, of the fifty-seven civil wars, starting from 1945 that ended before 1993, only one-fourth ended by negotiation, and of these, hostilities resumed in 75 percent. Hugh Miall, The Peacemakers, 187. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," American Political Science Review, 94, no. 4, (Dec 2000), 779. Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review, 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 684-685.
2 Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681-687.
3 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, "The Bloody Path of Change: The Case of Post-Soviet Tajikistan," The Harriman Institute Forum 6, no. 11 (July 1993): 1-10.
4 Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, "Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1, (February 2002): 3-13.
5 For instance, objective data are not available for measuring the concepts such as monitoring, power balancing and incentives, which the rational-instrumental approach uses to explain durable peace.
6 Examples of this literature include Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); Barry Wolf, "When the Weak Attack the Strong: Failures of Deterrence," A Rand Note N-3261-A, Prepared for the U. S. Army, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1990); Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd edition, (New York: The Free Press, 1988.).
7 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," World Bank, October 21, 2001. [http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedandgrievance.htm.] As a representative of the greed model, Todd Sandler claims, "disputes over territories and resources already represent the leading cause of civil war and interstate conflicts." Todd Sandler, "Economic Analysis of Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 6, (December 2000), 724-5.
8 "Resource mobilization theory" conceptualizes social movements as "institutionalized social actors mobilizing supporters for political purposes" rather than as "epiphenomenal expressions of deeper structural strain in the social system." Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach, (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991) p. 2.
9 I. William Zartman,Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) 266-73.
10 The 50% Solution: How to Bargain Successfully With Hijackers, Strikers, Bosses, Oil Magnates, Arabs, Russians and Other Worthy Opponents in this Modern World, ed. I. William Zartman, (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1983). In his description of conflict and its resolution, Zartman diminishes the independent role of culture.
11 The possibility of rebel armies seizing primary product raw materials such as diamonds, oil or valuable trees makes natural resource exports a measure of the greed factor. Natural resources, if abundant, may also create a well-financed government that rebels cannot challenge. According to Collier, the risk of civil war is greatest when natural resource exports are between 25 and 30% of GNP.
12 Barbara F. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization and Commitments to Peace," International Security 24, no. 1 (summer 1999): 127-155.
13 See Kumar, ibid., 211.
14 There are two generally accepted routes by which parties' positions can converge. One is when either or both parties make compromises either coerced or voluntary. The other is through the discovery of creative outcomes that can bridge the interests of both without either having to make extensive compromises. Miall, ibid., 65.
15 The director of an international NGO, who worked in Dushanbe throughout the civil war, claimed that the opposition representatives first demanded a new Mercedes for each of their leaders before they would agree to UN negotiations. Opposition leaders, of course, deny this and some show no evidence of living at any higher standard than the rest of Tajik society.
16 The opposition demanded and did receive control of the Customs Ministry as a condition of that settlement. According to personal observation, corroborated by many others, all of the nicest houses in any neighborhood belong to the customs police.
17 After the Aga Khan made relief aid to the Pamirs dependent on Pamiris abstaining from and controlling drug smuggling, the major flow of drugs shifted to a different route.
18 Advocacy of this idea is commonly attributed to Geertz (1963) referencing E. Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," British Journal of Sociology, (June 1957). Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford Geertz, (New York: The Free Press, 1963).
19 According to Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, "Ethnic fractionalization and its square are both highly significant, but nonmonotonic." The duration of civil war increases to a peak when ethnic fractionalization is at 50. Societies with a score of 50 have eight times higher probability of war and the duration of wars are 77% longer than for societies that are either homogenous or more completely fractionalized. Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Måns Söderbom. "On the Duration of Civil War" World Bank, May 2001 [Development Research Group, University of California, Irvine, Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies, Workshop on Civil Wars and Post-Conflict Transitions, May 18-20, 2001.] http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedandgrievance.htm
20 "In sharpest contrast with most academic analysts of nationalism, those who have successfully mobilized nations have understood that at the core of ethnopsychology is the sense of shared blood, and they have not hesitated to appeal to it." Walker Conner, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) 197.
21 The journalistic model blames ethnic violence on "ancient hatreds" rather than on the strategies of politicians, and George H. W. Bush invoked the same model to justify the initial reluctance of the US to involve itself in the former Yugoslavia. Lenin used an organismic model of groups coalescing into shared language, economic system and territory, thereby evolving from a group to a tribe, to a people and finally to a nation. See especially Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997.
22 John Samuel Schoeberlein-Engel, "Identity in Central Asia: Construction and Contention in Conceptions of "Ozbek," "Tajik," "Samarqandi" and Other Groups" (Ph. D. Diss., Harvard University, 1994).
23 Primordial ties are in disrepute because of the "havoc wreaked, both upon themselves and others, by those modern (or semi-modern) states that did passionately seek to become primordial rather than civil political communities" Geertz (1963), ibid., 112.
24 John Burton deliberately alters the word prevention to "provention" as a neologism for his ideas of problem-solving, proactively satisfying human needs in order to prevent conflict. He writes, "In this approach to conflict resolution, the nature of the human being and the identity group is a given. The resolution of problems and conflict is based on an acceptance of the individual and identity group as givens." John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, (Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press, 1990), 153.
25 Burton, ibid.
26 Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interest: A Sociology of International Relations, (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1999), 69.
27 Mark I. Lichbach, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach, Alan S. Zuckerman, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 263.
28 "Ethnicity is so elusive and difficult to understand precisely because ethnic identity is both primordial and residual, and original location and source of identity, and a residual category left behind by national citizenship or class location." Michael S. Kimmel, "Tradition as Revolt: The Moral and Political Economy of Ethnic Nationalism," in Current Perspectives in Social Theory 16, ed. Jennifer M Lehmann, (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press Inc. 1996), 77. See also Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 70.
29 Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," in Annual Review of Sociology, 27, ed. Karen S. Cook and John Hagan, (Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, 2001)
30 "Identity can be taken to be the outcome of complex social processes which embed the person in a series of social contexts." P. W. Preston, Political/cultural Identity: Citizens and Nations in a Global Era, (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage publications, 1997), 53
31 This pattern of thinking developed out of an evaluation of failures of humanitarian and military peacekeeping projects since the 1970s. "Humanitarian aid and military peacekeeping were not enough. They did not address the root causes of conflict or secure social development beyond emergencies" Michael Pugh, "Introduction: The Ownership of Regeneration and Peacebuilding," In Regeneration of War Torn Societies, ed. Michael Pugh, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 4.
32 For instance, I. William Zartman (1995) advocates the combination of a strongman leader, foreign support and economic resurrection that is necessary for reconstruction, and Stedman (1997) puts the emphasis on the elimination, management, or control of "spoilers. " Stephan John Stedman, 1997, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security 22 (Fall): 5-53. I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995).
33 One of the classic expositions of the contribution of a social constructivist approach to peacebuilding is the focus on relationships in John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).
34 John Paul Lederach, ibid.; Harold H. Saunders, A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).
35 Daniel Yankelovich, in The Magic of Dialogue: Transforming Conflict into Cooperation, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1999) presents a specific narrow meaning of dialogue. He mentions the "sustained dialogue" project of Harold Saunders, which would be a subset of "dialogue" and also intended as a technical term.
36 Sidney Tarrow, "States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements," in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 41-61.
37 These observations derive from the author's experiences during the 2000-2001 academic year in which he taught international relations and economics at the Technological University of Tajikistan in Dushanbe. Interviews with former opposition leaders were conducted in July 2001. The author has the English translation of speeches and book excerpts by Foreign Minister Talbok Nazarov due to assisting with this translation.
38 "We, Tajiks went through [a] severe civil war and in spite of it, we were the first to conduct intensive negotiations with the armed opposition and to move closely to mutual understanding of the diametrically opposed forces of the country." "Speech of Emomali Rahmonov, President of the Republic of Tajikistan at the Meeting of Representatives of Political Parties, Political Associations and Cultural Centres of the Ethnic Groups of Tajikistan, March 1, 1996," in Agreement on National Conciliation of Tajikistan, ed. A. A. Abdumannonov, (Dushanbe: Public Council of the Republic of Tajikistan, 2000), 21.
39 These factors can be observed in the following quote from the speech, "Political Dialogue As A Base Of The Settlement Of The Inter-Tajik Conflict," given by the Academician Talbok Nazarov, Foreign Minister of Tajikistan, to the UN June, 2002. "… it was quite evident that the war was also religious in nature. In addition, the roots of the conflict lay rather deeper and were connected with the geopolitical interests of external forces and the temptation of various political parties and movements to usurp power."
40 G. Ileuova, B. Turekhanova, and O. Simakova, "Sociological Portrait of Elite of Tajikistan," Central Asia Politics and Economics no 2, November 2000): 65-67.
41 On April 11, Deputy Interior Minister Khabib Sanginov was assassinated, and afterward a number of suspects were arrested. On the fifteenth of June, 15 people including workers from the German Agro Action (GAA) famine-relief agency, Security Ministry servicemen, and one U.S. citizen were taken hostage in Tavildara by people demanding the release of their relatives who had been imprisoned for killing the Deputy Interior Minister. The kidnappers released their NGO worker hostages through the government's negotiation, but one week later a former opposition field commander named Rahmon "Hitler" Sanginov attacked the guard post nine kilometers East of Dushanbe, killing some soldiers and again taking hostages. The government launched a military effort to eliminate Sanginov and his gang. Over the next three days, forty-one of Sanginov's men were reported killed and 60 captured. "Hostage-Taking And Unrest In Eastern Tajikistan," Field Reports, Wednesday/July 4, 2001, [http://www.cacianalyst.org/July_4_2001/July_4_2001_Hosatge-Taking_and_Unrest.htm].
42 According to news reports, the President claimed he had still wanted to negotiate, but it was the Mayor that insisted on the use of force. Tajikistan Confirms Rebel Leaders Still At Large, 29 June, 2001. [http://www.cacianalyst.org/July_4_2001/July_4_2001_News_Bites.htm.]
43 According to Chetan Kumar, "Experts have argued that the most significant question with regard to civil wars is why certain civil wars do not resume after a cease-fire or an agreement." Chetan Kumar, "Conclusion," in Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, ed. Elizabeth M. Cousens, Chetan Kumar, and Karin Wermester, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 195.
44 According to Haas, using a database of 319 disputes from 1945 to 1985, "Neither the UN nor the regionals have successfully stopped ongoing hostilities with any consistency since the early 1960s. The record of both with respect to settling disputes has almost always been dismal." He goes on to explain, "We also know the UN's most persistent weakness: it is unable, except in rare circumstances, to settle any dispute with finality." Ernst B. Haas, Why We Still Need the United Nations: The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1984, (Berkeley: University of California, 1986), 17, 56.
45 Broome explains that the goal of understanding is not a product of disregarding oneself, nor empathy, but the creation of a higher universality, a synthesizing position created through the process of the interaction. "Interculturalists often use the phrase 'third culture' to describe the outcome of a long-term relationship." Benjamin J. Broome, "Managing Differences in Conflict Resolution," in Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application, ed. Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), 103.
46 Joseph P. Folger, "Evaluating Evaluation in Ethnic Conflict Resolution: Themes from, and Commentary on, the Haverford-Bryn Mawr Conference," in Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management: Theorizing Success and Failure, ed. Marc Howard Ross and Jay Rothman, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1999), 222.
47 Marc Howard Ross, "The Relevance of Culture for the Study of Political Psychology and Ethnic Conflict," in The Conflict and Culture Reader, ed. Pat K. Chew, (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 239.
48 Harold H. Saunders, A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflict, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 150.
49 Ibid., 84.
50 Ibid., 82.
51 Ibid., 155.
52 Saunders says, "Their way of dealing with each other had changed." Ibid., 157.
53 Ibid., 157.
54 The Minister of Culture (Abdurahim Rahimov, July 7, 2001), explained the official interpretation of the meaning of the Somonid era. He rejected the statement that "The Somonis should be understood as a symbol of power and control." He replied, "They didn’t rule nations or peoples, they only organized the area. Better to say they are not the symbol of power and control, but of spiritualism and intellect." Other answers regarding the identity of Uzbeks and the status of Tajiki conform to a nationalist standpoint.
55 As Avruch and Black express it, " . . . culture does not 'cause' behavior - neither aggression, nor the business cycle, nor the grand flow of history - cultural analysis is not causal analysis." Kevin Avruch and Peter W. Black, "Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings," in Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application, ed. Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), 135.
56 David Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997) 127. "Historically, Bourdieu sees cultural fields progressively developing and gaining autonomy from the political and economic fields."
57 This is the tenor of the government's portrayal of how sustainable peace is being developed in Tajikistan, as shown in the following excerpts from Foreign Minister Talbok Nazarov's speech, "Political Dialogue As A Base Of The Settlement Of The Inter-Tajik Conflict." to the UN. " . . . the experience of conflict resolution by political dialogue may be used in those countries where the "syndrome" of civil war still prevails. The civil war in Tajikistan, as we have said, was resolved in a short time by means of political dialogue -- the main instrument during the transition from the war to peace."
|
Bibliography
Avruch, Kevin. Culture and Conflict Resolution. Washington, DC: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 1998
Avruch, Kevin and Peter W. Black. "Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings."
In Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application,
ed. Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, 131-145. New York:
Manchester University Press, 1993.
Berezin, Mabel. "Politics and Culture: A Less Fissured Terrain." In Annual Review
of Sociology 23, ed. Karen S. Cook and John Hagan, 361-383. Palo Alto, CA:
Annual Reviews Inc., 1997
Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War, 3rd Ed., New York: The Free Press, 1988.
Broome, Benjamin J. "Managing Differences in Conflict Resolution." In Conflict
Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application, ed. Dennis J.
D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, 97-111. New York: Manchester University Press, 1993.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. The War Trap. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1981.
Burton, John. Conflict: Resolution and Provention. Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press,
1990.
Boudon, Raymond. Theories of Social Change: A Critical Appraisal. Translated by J. C.
Whitehouse, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
Broome, Benjamin J. "Managing Differences in Conflict Resolution." In Conflict
Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application, ed. Dennis J.
D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, 97-111. New York: Manchester
University Press, 1993.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. "Bridging the Rational-Choice / Constructivist Gap? Theorizing
Social Interaction in European Institutions." ARENA Working Papers --
WP 00/11B ARENA and University of Oslo [http://www.arena.uio.no/
publications/wp00_11.htm]
Chong, Dennis. Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." World Bank,
October 21, 2001. [http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/
greedandgrievance.htm.]
Collier, Paul and Nicholas Sambanis. "Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda."
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1, (February 2002): 3-13.
Conner, Walker. Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1994.
Croucher, Sheila L. "Constructing the Ethnic Spectacle: Identity Politics in a
Postmodern World." In The Ethnic Entanglement: Conflict and Intervention
in World Politics, ed. John F. Stack, Jr. and Lui Hebron, 123-140. Westport,
Connecticut: Praeger, 1999.
Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis "International Peacebuilding: A
Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." American Political Science Review
94, no. 4. (Dec 2000): 779-802
Eyerman, Ron and Andrew Jamison. Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991
Folger, Joseph P. "Evaluating Evaluation in Ethnic Conflict Resolution: Themes
from, and Commentary on, the Haverford-Bryn Mawr Conference." In Theory
and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management: Theorizing Success and
Failure," ed. Marc Howard Ross and Jay Rothman, 209-240. New York,
St. Martin's Press, 1999.
Geertz, Clifford. "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil
Patriots in the New States." In Old Societies and New states: The Quest for
Modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford Geertz, 105-157. New York:
The Free Press, 1963.
Gurr, Ted Robert and Barbara Harff. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. Boulder:
Westview Press, 1994.
Haas, Ernst B. Why We Still Need the United Nations: The Collective Management
of International Conflict, 1945-1984. Berkeley: University of California,
1986.
Hechter, Michael. "Rational Choice Theory and the Study of Race and Ethnic
Relations." In Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations, ed. John Rex, David
Mason, 264-279, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press,
1986.
"Hostage-Taking And Unrest In Eastern Tajikistan," Field Reports Wednesday/
July 4, 2001, [http://www.cacianalyst.org/July_4_2001/July_4_2001_HosTage-
Taking_and_Unrest.htm].
Kahler, Miles. "Rationality in International Relations." International Organization
52, no. 4, (Autumn 1998): 919-941.
Kimmel, Michael S. "Tradition as Revolt: The Moral and Political Economy of
Ethnic Nationalism." In Current Perspectives in Social Theory 16, ed. Jennifer
M. Lehmann, 71-98. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press Inc. 1996.
Kumar, Chetan. "Conclusion." In Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in
Fragile Societies, ed. Elizabeth M. Cousens, Chetan Kumar, and Karin
Wermester, 183-220. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001
Lederach, John Paul. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided
Societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997.
Licklider, Roy. "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-
1993." American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995):
681-687.
Lichbach, Mark I. "Social Theory and Comparative Politics." In Comparative
Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach,
Alan S. Zuckerman, 239-276. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Miall, Hugh. The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Since 1945. New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.
Miller, Byron. "Collective Action and Rational Choice: Place, Community and the
Limits to Individual Self- Interest." Economic Geography 68, no. 1 (January
1992): 22-42.
McSweeney, Bill. Security, Identity and Interest: A Sociology of International
Relations. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press 1999.
Mueller, Carol McClurg. "Building Social Movement Theory." In Frontiers in
Social Movement Theory, ed. by Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller,
3-26. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992.
Nazarov, Talbok. "Political Dialogue as a Base of the Settlement of The Inter-Tajik
Conflict." Speech to the UN, June 2002.
Pasic, Sujarta Chakrabarti. "Culturing International Relations Theory: A Call for
Extension." In The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. Yosef
Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, 85-104. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997
Polletta, Francesca and James M. Jasper. "Collective Identity and Social
Movements." In Annual Review of Sociology 27, ed. Karen S. Cook and John
Hagan, 283-305. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, 2001.
Preston, P. W. Political/Cultural Identity: Citizens and Nations in a Global Era.
Thousand Oaks,Calif.: Sage Publications, 1997.
Pugh, Michael. "Introduction: The Ownership of Regeneration and Peacebuilding."
In Regeneration of War Torn Societies, ed. Michael Pugh, 1-12. New York:
St. Martin's Press, 2000.
Rahmonov, Emomali. "Speech of Emomali Rahmonov, […] March 1, 1996." In
Agreement on National Conciliation of Tajikistan, ed. A. A. Abdumannonov,
21-24. Dushanbe: Public Council of the Republic of Tajikistan, 2000.
Richardson, John M. Jr. and Jianxin Wang. "Peace Accords: Conflict Resolution in
Divided Societies." In Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict, ed. K. M. de
Siva and S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, 173-198. New York: Pinter Publishers,
1999.
Ross, Marc Howard. "The Relevance of Culture for the Study of Political
Psychology and Ethnic Conflict." In The Conflict and Culture Reader, ed. Pat
K. Chew, 236-240. New York: New York University Press, 2001.
Sandler, Todd. "Economic Analysis of Conflict." Journal of Conflict Resolution 44,
no. 6. (December 2000): 723-749.
Sandole, Dennis J. D. "Future Directions in Theory and Research." In Conflict
Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application, ed. Dennis J.
D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, 276-284. New York: Manchester
University Press, 1993.
Saunders, Harold H. A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform
Racial and Ethnic Conflict. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.
Schoeberlein-Engel, John Samuel. "Identity in Central Asia: Construction and
Contention in Conceptions of "Ozbek," "Tajik," "Samarqandi" and Other
Groups." Ph. D. Diss., Harvard University, 1994.
Stedman, Stephan John. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." International
Security 22 (Fall 1997): 5-53.
Swartz, David. Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1997.
Swidler, Ann. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." American Sociological
Review 51, (April 1986): 273-286.
Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. "The Bloody Path of Change: The Case of Post-Soviet
Tajikistan." The Harriman Institute Forum 6, no. 11 (July 1993): 1-10.
The 50% Solution : How to Bargain Successfully With Hijackers, Strikers, Bosses,
Oil Magnates, Arabs, Russians and Other Worthy Opponents in this Modern
World, ed. I. William Zartman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.
Useem, Bert. "Breakdown Theories of Collective Action." In Annual Review of
Sociology 24, ed. Karen S. Cook and John Hagan, 215-38. Palo Alto, CA:
Annual Reviews, 1998
Walter, Barbara F. "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization,
Democratization and Commitments to Peace." International Security 24,
no. 1 (Summer 1999): 127-155.
Wolf, Barry. "When the Weak Attack the Strong: Failures of Deterrence." A Rand
Note: N-3261-A, Prepared for the U. S. Army. Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
1990.
Zartman, I. William. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
________ "Putting Things Back Together." In Collapsed States: The
Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William
Zartman. Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995.
|
|
