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The consolidation of peace during the five years after negotiations ended the civil war in Tajikistan
provides support for a social constructivist approach to conflict resolution. A comparison of theoretical perspectives in the fields of identity politics, social movements, conflict and conflict resolution reveals the importance of connecting social constructivism with a corresponding conflict resolution methodology. The observations of negotiators, that changes in thinking precede formal arrangements in mediations, support the constructivist position on the negotiated and instrumental character of identities and interests. Tajikistan offers an example of the successful application of the "Sustained Dialogue" methodology, consistent with the social constructivist standpoint. Because this process incorporated a model for creating civil society, it enabled a society-changing process, making sustainable peace possible. Tajikistan's experience with Sustained Dialogue shows the significance of social constructivism and provides an example for other post-conflict states.
Social Constructivism in Conflict Resolution
The peace agreement ending the civil war in Tajikistan, now five years old, provides a useful illustration to adjudicate the debate among diverse perspectives on conflict resolution. Prevalent perspectives in the fields of identity politics, social movements, and conflict resolution fail to offer satisfying explanations for the consolidation of peace. This paper criticizes common explanations of the Tajik civil war and argues that the conditions that accompanied the peace agreement negotiations justify greater consideration of social constructivism in discussions of conflict resolution theory. The first section reviews common explanations of the Tajik civil war; the second summarizes the work of Harold Saunders in A Public Peace Process, which describes the "Inter-Tajik Dialogue" that proceeded during formal negotiations. The third section summarizes the debate within three different areas of theory. In the fourth section I claim that the accomplishments of the "Sustained Dialogue," as a conflict resolution methodology consistent with social constructivism, justifies further work developing this perspective.
Social constructivism does not consider conflict solely the product of competition between groups with fixed identities or interests, but rather as the interactive product of choices, culture and context that cause a breakdown in social relations. Identities, interests and institutions all play a role in driving outcomes.1 The social-constructivist viewpoint emphasizes how cultural-identity comes into existence as a function of social and political action.2 This is supremely relevant to conflict resolution because a number of scholars have noted that in successful negotiations to end an intractable civil war, identities and interests do not remain fixed. In some descriptions, during negotiations individuals gain another layer of identity, gain new interests or redefine their interests.3 As Joseph Folger expresses it, " . . . only recently have practitioners and researchers begun to entertain the possibility that mediations may change the parties as well as their situations.4 Marc Howard Ross emphasizes that changes in thinking must first occur in order that groups can believe formal arrangements are actually possible.5
Furthermore, with approbation Hugh Miall cites Curle (1986) to say, " . . . the significant stages [in the negotiation process] are the changes in vision rather than the signing of agreements that result from them, and the gradual erosion of fear, antipathy and suspicion, and the slow shift of public opinion."6 The processes by which identities and interests change, so that negotiation becomes effective, cannot be deduced solely from explanations that describe conditions leading to conflict (context), apart from culture and individual agency.
Most observers describe the Tajik civil war as caused by competition between groups with fixed identities and interests. They emphasize the supporting "structural" conditions that led people in different regions to define their identity in terms of loyalty to their region in competition against other regions. Under a social-constructivist approach none of the following historical, geographical, social or political supporting factors is disregarded or ignored. Instead, not only do the factors listed below influence the social behavior of individuals, but also agents use these factors as materials that in the creation of their identity and collective action.7
A past history of environmentally destructive development, competition for land and water, and forced relocations, such as people from Gharm and Badakhshan being moved to Qurgan-Teppe, has created conditions in which diverse groups were subjected to inequality, and social stress, provoking tension, and animosity.
Mountainous geography prevents travel by road over many months of the year between the capital, Dushanbe, and either the Sugd province or Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO). These physical barriers between regions support the development of strong regional loyalties that became a tool in the hands of those willing to use violence to gain power.
Inequalities, such as the poverty and underdevelopment of the region around Kulob compared to the Sugd region, fueled the spirit of regional loyalty and competition. Regional competition created the potential for alliances between regions and the identification of competing political viewpoints with different regions.
The breakdown of centralized Soviet control allowed diverse nationalists, democrats and Islamists to present their vision of the future of the republic in competition with the existing government and of neo-communists. The collapse of the Soviet Union also placed unexpected responsibilities on a new state apparatus that was ill equipped to resolve serious social problems. This enabled an irresponsible and even criminal exploitation of fears and greed that overflowed into violence.
These are only a few of the commonly mentioned conditions that supported the Tajik civil war. However, as structural conditions they lack an account of agency or of the specific initiating triggers of the conflict. The prescriptions for conflict prevention, resolution and consolidation of peace that flow from this analysis offer no correlation with the "Sustained Dialogue" process which aided the resolution of the Tajik civil war.8 Any success of the Tajik Peace agreement, compared to the historical record of difficulty in resolving civil wars in general, represents an unusual situation that deserves study.9
The Political Accomplishment of Peace
Journalistic descriptions of Tajikistan invariably call the country "war-torn" and imply that wartime conditions still prevail. Various assassinations, bombings, reports of attacks on police and armed forces and small-scale incursions, have seemed to cast doubt on claims that the Peace Agreement represents the start of sustained peace. Without disregarding in any way the grievous nature of such events, or the ongoing suffering and destruction from the war, four observations have convinced me that the peace agreement represents an event that needs explaining.1O These observations include the arguments of former opposition leaders, the reaction to the small insurrection of July 2001, the government's portrayal of the peace agreement, and the tone of city life in Dushanbe.
Visitors to Dushanbe and Leninabod find conditions are as secure as in many American neighborhoods. The security briefing conducted by the UNDP for NGO leaders has been reassuring for the low numbers and trivial character of crimes reported—for a city of that size. There was nothing about the quality of police presence on the streets that would make a person fearful. I never felt at risk or in danger, even walking through narrow alleys in several regions of the city in the dark early in the morning and quite late at night. Compared to Iran or even Uzbekistan, Tajikistan offers a noticeable air of freedom. The checkpoints between regions did not cause any problems in traveling to Aini, Panjikent, Khujand or even to the Gharm, Tavildara and Badakhshan regions. Admittedly, police corruption and abuse of power are real problems for the everyday life of citizens, but not to the extent of threatening the general security.
The second observation notes the way the government describes the peace agreement. Although one may dismiss the words of those who want to nominate President Emomali Rahmonov for a Nobel Peace Prize, the government's pride in the agreement and efforts to commemorate it deserve notice. According to the official ideology, by reaching an agreement with Islamists and bringing them into the government, the Peace Agreement demonstrates that Tajiks have learned how to negotiate, have gained political maturity, and therefore their experiences are an example to the world.11 Although the latest elections for Parliament and President were deeply flawed, the concessions extended to the former opposition are still largely being honored. Even though leaders on the "government" or "neo-communist" side are tempted to blame the Islamists, official pronouncements tend to emphasize the role of external interference and the influence of the civil war in Afghanistan for the civil war.12 However, they have largely put their ideological battle with Islam behind them and instead claim that their association with the Islamists demonstrates their superior political virtues. All this indicates that the civil war is over and that styles of thinking have changed.
In the third observation, former opposition leaders do not regard the firing of some of their number from government positions as a violation of the Peace Agreement article specifying that "thirty percent" of significant government posts should be held by the former opposition. They say that now after the most recent elections for parliament, the President and the ratification of the Constitution, the country effectively has a new government to which that condition no longer applies. Moreover, former opposition leaders report that all those who have performed their functions competently have retained their positions and that former opposition members in the second and third tier still represent thirty percent of the government. Leaders of the former opposition who now work at high levels of the government claim that they are not marginalized, have not "sold-out" their convictions, but rather they are able to effectively engage the policymaking process. They report an internal process of debate and compromise on government policy in which their views are represented and sometimes prevail. This signifies an important change in thinking.
The fourth observation notes the public reaction to an insurrection in late June 2001. On April 11, Deputy Interior Minister Khabib Sanginov was assassinated, and afterward a number of suspects were arrested. On the fifteenth of June, 15 people including workers from the German Agro Action (GAA) famine-relief agency, Security Ministry servicemen, and one U.S. citizen were taken hostage in Tavildara by people demanding the release of their relatives who had been imprisoned for killing the Deputy Interior Minister. The kidnappers released their NGO worker hostages through the government's negotiation, but one week later a former opposition field commander named Rahmon "Hitler" Sanginov attacked the guard post nine kilometers East of Dushanbe, killing some soldiers and again taking hostages.13 The government launched a military effort to eliminate Sanginov and his gang. Over the next three days, forty-one of Sanginov's men were reported killed and 60 captured.
The public reaction to this incident is interesting because they regarded it as some symbolic last rebellion, which in its defeat signaled the triumph of the government in ensuring the safety and stability of the people. Right after the crushing of Rakhmon Sanginov's rebellion, during a previously scheduled concert in the park near the Opera and Ballet Theater the Mayor of Dushanbe spoke claiming that this was the beginning of greater security and now people could feel safe being out late at night.14 The government has reported other shootouts and successful confrontations with remnants of this same gang on July 7 and July 20, and other political assassinations have followed. However, the expression by many people that a point of victory of peace and security over the residual forces from the civil war had been reached is another sign that security conditions are improving.
Since these four observations, in part, illustrate that the Peace Agreement in Tajikistan has laid a foundation for a sustainable peace, this merits study of the process by which it developed.15 Although neighboring states served as guarantors of the peace agreement, provided ideas and exerted pressure on both sides to settle, that is not enough to explain the consolidation of peace. Even though the UN played a substantial role in the Tajik peace agreement negotiations, the broad record of UN activity does not permit giving the UN and its personnel sole credit.16 In addition to the efforts of neighboring states and the UN, there was another form of outside intervention that deserves consideration for its contribution to the character of the peace created through the Inter-Tajik Peace Negotiations. This intervention was the joint Russian-American "Dartmouth Conference" Sustained Dialogue program, which is described in the book A Public Peace Process by Harold Saunders. It preceded and accompanied the negotiations of the Tajik Peace Agreement.
A Public Peace Process
Harold Saunders believes that social relationships can be transformed through continuous interaction and sustained dialogue by citizens outside of government. He claims that his intervention, which preceded and then ran parallel to the formal negotiations of the Tajik Peace Agreement, represents " . . . the most intensive testing ground for developing and refining the two-part strategy. For that reason, it is the best current case for demonstrating how this strategy for managing conflict in divided societies works."17 Given such a claim and the success of the peace agreement, it is worth examining what this methodology represents and how it fits in with theories of conflict resolution.
He writes, "Peace agreements will not produce peace until they are embedded in a political process for transforming a broadening range of relationships over time."18 His term "public peace process" means the activity of citizens, ideally interacting on many levels, outside of government, separate from formal mediation or negotiations by governments. Saunders believes that, at its best, this can complement, support and even energize the official process. He attempts to assist participants in creating a shared meaning of what their societies should become so that they become full partners with governments, even compelling governments to work with them when necessary. Saunders explains that redefining politics means not just reforming government, but also more importantly putting a responsible public of active citizens into politics. The participants in the public peace process end up creating a part of civil society.
He observes that parties in deeply rooted conflicts are generally unprepared for negotiation because they cannot define the issues at stake. In addition, he warns, " . . . people do not negotiate about their fears, historical grievances or identities. Conflict at that level must be dealt with through processes among human beings working together in the political arena without reference to authorities."19 If there has been no transformation of the political environment, he predicts that negotiations, even if they lead to an agreement and are technically sound, they will not be fully implemented or have the intended consequences. Therefore, negotiations only succeed when embedded in a larger political process.
Sustained Dialogue is different from negotiation because of its focus on changing relationships rather than on choosing a policy direction or dividing material goods or power. It is structured to provide an experience within the dialogue group so that the group can design a plan for changing relationships in the larger community. The goal is to create a sense of the kind of community that antagonists would like to build together to serve the interests of each.
Saunders describes the consequence of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, which began in March 1993 in Moscow and met every two to four months thereafter. "By working to get into the minds, interests and feelings of others, each participant changes . . .. [T]he parties come to define their interests as what they can live with—not their optimal interests—in order to reach the cooperation with others necessary to achieve what all parties absolutely need."20 Saunders cautions, "No participant gives up her or his identity, but each recognizes enough of the other's valid human claims that he or she will act differently toward the other."21 Sustained dialogue is the creation of a culture of the group; just as a society is based on shared meanings embodied in its culture.
Although Saunders is modest about what can actually be claimed for consequences from this effort, the evidence appears significant. For example, one of the issues discussed in the fourth meeting of the group was the difficulty of involving a geographically dispersed and ideologically diverse opposition. Just after that, elements of the opposition met in Tehran, signed a declaration with a formal platform and established an office in Moscow to coordinate their position. Although two members of the dialogue participated in that action, it is not possible to prove cause and effect. After Dialogue 5, an envoy of the UN Secretary General arranged for a first round of negotiations in April, which included two dialogue members on the opposition team and one on the government team. Although no direct cause and effect can be proven, he notes, "Participants in the government decision to negotiate and U. N. officials credited the work of the Dialogue with having played a significant role."22
Regarding the production in the dialogue of a finished paper, "Memorandum on a Negotiating Process in Tajikistan," he writes that this was a great accomplishment for both sides to work together productively. Because of the many different people and factors at play in a complex interaction, the degree of influence cannot be proved, but he notes, "[o]pposition members said [this memorandum] served as a guide for the opposition's approach."23 The pride that participants took in jointly producing this statement proves that the group members had moved into a new way of thinking.24 Because there are a multitude of influences and actors at work in any decision, and even decision makers cannot say what influenced them most, therefore Saunders notes it is impossible to claim direct cause-and-effect for the consequences of the Dialogue, in spite of an impressive coincidence of interactions. Documentation produced during the Dialogue includes an interview with a former high Tajikistani official describing the role of the Dialogue in the government decision to negotiate as significant. They have a letter to the same intent from the former US deputy chief of mission in Tajikistan, and an official for the UN who oversaw the negotiations cited the Dialogue in a speech as "the most important nonofficial group complementing UN sponsored negotiations."25
Saunders believes that "deep-rooted human conflicts will be transformed into peaceful relationships only in the context of a multilevel peace process conducted by whole human beings acting in whole bodies politic."26 This is not the primary vehicle for peacemaking, but it involves citizens outside of government, alongside formal diplomacy. He claims that the government cannot succeed unless citizens can change relationships. Promotion of a "Sustained Dialogue" does not constitute an attempt to supplant formal negotiations or the formal struggle over the issues of power, security and policy. Instead, dialogue affects the character of the peace produced to improve its sustainability. Sustained Dialogue represents a methodology that incorporates and improves upon previous types of strategies and efforts. However, like most of conflict resolution literature, A Public Peace is methodology without a base in theory, whether theories of cultural identity, social mobilization or of conflict itself. The sustained peace in Tajikistan, and the role in that peace played by sustained dialogue, merits establishing a theoretical base for this methodology.
Competing Theoretical Perspectives
Conflict in the former Soviet Union is frequently characterized in terms of ethnicity, or in the case of Tajikistan, as ethnoregionalism. The subject of ethnicity and cultural identity is marked by a fairly clear pattern of debate between three general perspectives-- social constructivist, primordialist, and rational-instrumentalist. Rationality is commonly defined as the calculation of individuals who economize in attempting to reach their goals, or to maximize their "expected utility." The rational-instrumentalist position is a "thin" version of rational choice. It merely claims that a leader or "political entrepreneur" uses the symbols of collective identity in appealing to collective fears, and with calculated acts of violence stirs up strong emotions of group loyalty in order to retain a position. There is a well-developed rational choice literature that claims to explain group loyalty.27 However, in order to produce its austere mathematical models of behavior it assumes that people make choices individually, with full information, stable, and forward-looking preferences, and a high degree of cognitive capability, all of which correspond poorly to the behavior of real people.28
Because agents are shaped by their environment, this alters their properties and existence as well as their choices. As Miles Kahler explains, "Identity may itself affect interests and behavior in a direct and unmediated way that is difficult to reconcile with rational choice models."29 In the words of Jeffrey Checkel, "If one defines social interaction as a process during which fundamental agent properties can change, then it is clear that rational choice or rational-choice institutionalist arguments have little to say in this regard."30 The main features of rational choice—a "thin" view of agency and unrealistic assumptions—hinder its applicability, but even more so its usefulness is impaired by its disregard for the role of culture and of changing interests.
In contrast to the rational choice perspective, which takes interests as fixed and ignores particular identities, the opposite view is often called primordialism. Primordialism explains identity as attachment or loyalty to the group that individuals enter at birth. Therefore, identity is defined in terms not only of language, religion, and culture, but more importantly of blood ties and region of origin.31 Academic explanations of identity reject primordialism as inaccurate descriptively, as well as for its role as a basis of policy. For example, John Schoeberlein's seminal dissertation on identity highlights the weakness of the terms "Uzbek" and "Tajik" as descriptions of bounded units of meaning. He demonstrates this using evidence of changing identities and transitional forms of identity and by noting how people describe themselves. The tendency toward ethnic conflict unleashed when states define themselves in terms of primordial qualities rather than by civic nationalism also brings disrepute on primordialism.32
Primordialism cannot be dismissed or ignored because it remains significant as a form of discourse used effectively by elites their struggle to mobilize their people.33 It remains useful to explain the emotional power of an ethnic conflict, but it fails to explain why some groups can live together peacefully for long periods of time before erupting into violence. Primordialism describes the framework used by journalists who do not understand the dynamics of the violence on which they report, it formed the basis of Soviet nationality policy, and it still forms the basis for US policy in many areas.34 Primordialism emphasizes those qualities missing from the rational choice perspective, such as the social, cultural and emotional character of identity. Despite these flaws, scholars still find explanatory power in the role of cultural-identity and some elements of "group identity orientation," such as "expressive logic" in contrast to instrumental logic. The contrast between rational choice and primordialism justifies efforts to synthesize between these two positions, many of which define identity as a social construct.35
McSweeney describes social constructivism as "a focus on the processes and practices by which people and groups construct their self-image."36 Both rational choice and "culture-as-values" say that people choose their actions individually according to either interests or values. In reasserting the significance of agency, Ann Swidler argues that action is always part of larger strategies constructed based on capacities given by culture. "Culture influences action through the shape and organization of those links [chains of action, not independent acts], not by determining the ends to which they are put."37 While Swidler's "tool-box" concept represents culture as a repertoire of available symbolic devices used to assert the agency of each individual or group, P. W. Preston emphasizes the contested nature of identity, which is a product of social learning.38 Material conditions, the processes of social definition, and the relationship between these two factors represent the concept of a negotiated identity.39 Social constructivism emphasizes the recreation and reinvention of groups as their boundaries are renegotiated and their symbols reinterpreted.40 If the group is a negotiated phenomenon, then the individual is not a rational agent maximizing her welfare within the constraints of institutions or following laws of motion, but rather an agent engaged in negotiating the terms of representation.
Those formulations of constructivism that only use interaction as their explanatory force are too exclusive. As Pasic explains it, "Constructivism limits potential to go further with the concept of shared meanings by making the implicit but extreme assertion that only practice informs."41 I would agree with Pasic that a bombardment of influences from social and cultural institutions is also involved, together with interaction, in constituting identities and interests.42 The interaction of social context and human agency is not just important for negotiating one's cultural-identity; these factors should also be used to evaluate theories of social movements.
Social Mobilization Theory
In Tajikistan the opposition was able to take power for a short period of time, in a culmination of mass demonstrations for democratic, nationalistic and Islamic values. Therefore, an understanding of these social mobilization processes derived from debates within the field of social movement theory should also fit in with patterns of debate in cultural-identity theory and theories about conflict. The pattern of explanations in the field of social mobilization is much less well defined, compared to the field of cultural identity. The theory closest to rational choice, called "resource mobilization," claims that social movements do not develop spontaneously, but that leaders use networks of association and the resources of pre-existing organizations to begin a new social movement.43 A successful social movement requires organizational skills to define propaganda and manage goal setting as well as the logistics of mobilizing crowds and recruiting new members. Resource-mobilization theory employs a rational-instrumental logic when it claims that leaders engage in instrumental cost-benefit calculations to plot movement strategy and that the people being recruited calculate the costs and benefits of participation.
The opposite approach is called "breakdown theory," which claims that any sign of weakening central control will allow group antagonisms to drive a spontaneous violent social movement. In this model, grievances—such as demands for recognition of group culture and identity—are constant. Journalistic portrayals of ethnic conflict as the result of "ancient hatreds" released by the collapse of central repression rely on this perspective. Breakdown theory claims that group behavior is a result of strong intuitive, emotional attachment to fixed characteristics of language, religion, culture, region of birth and kinship—primordial qualities of identity.
The third position, corresponding to social constructivism, is poorly defined, but Polleta and Jasper (2001) provide a good representation. They endeavor to " . . . identify the circumstances in which different relations between interest and identity, strategy and identity and politics and identity operate, circumstances that include cultural processes as well as structural ones."44 Their work fits compatibly with that of Jean Cohen (1985) who wrote that social movements should be analyzed as " . . . both instrumental and communicative, as both resource mobilizers and resource generators."45 As Mabel Berezin describes it, " . . . the field of social movements as it moves away from interest models . . . offers a promising area to recast political mobilization in cultural terms."46 In the same tone, Miller concludes that a realistic theory of collective action recognizes the mixture of selfish and unselfish action, communicative and strategic rationality and collective as well as individual identities. He writes, "Indeed, most of us belong to, and identify with, a multiplicity of communities and collectivities."47 These concepts provide the closest approach to a social constructivist theoretical base in social movement theory that would support a conflict resolution methodology dedicated to changeable identities and interests.
Conflict Resolution Perspectives
Because the civil war in Tajikistan has been resolved, it should also be analyzed in the context of the existing literature on conflict resolution. However, much of the writing on conflict resolution lacks well-defined theoretical positions or debate because it has been predominately aimed toward evaluating practice. As Dennis Sandole notes, within the field of conflict and peace studies "there is no agreement on even the basic, metaphysical level."48 Nevertheless, diverse studies of conflict resolution can also be categorized into a pattern of explanations similar to those observed in identity theory and social movement theory. To the extent that cultural-identity plays a role in social mobilization that leads to conflict, then a correspondence between theory categories in these different issue areas is natural.49
The rational choice perspective in conflict resolution explains war as the product of a calculation by the initiating party that it will win and that the expected benefits will outweigh the costs.50 Failed policies can be explained either due to the difficulties of measuring power, miscalculation or the degree of uncertainty.51 In the context of tensions between groups, the rational choice perspective explains conflict as caused by groups motivated by greed, governed by instrumental rationality, which attack or oppress other groups whenever they have an opportunity. If civil war is solely a function of greed and opportunity, then counterbalancing threat or force, which would raise the costs of violence, could deter the greedy.52 This presumes that the greedy antagonists are rational, economizing calculators of their utility.
The conflict resolution strategy that flows from these assumptions expects peace negotiation to occur at a "ripe moment" when both parties perceive a "hurting stalemate."53 However it appears difficult to define ripe moments and hurting stalemates before the fact.54 Success is then a function of finding a "split the difference" or 50% solution.55 However, because most external peace-making attempts focus on using incentives to encourage compromise, these agreements are fragile and can collapse if they do not evolve into resilient political processes.56 More sophisticated approaches seek to help contending parties to reframe their dispute to identify those shared interests in a resolution from which both can gain, thereby modifying the zero-sum character of the conflict.57 These approaches, informed by the rational choice assumption that interests are fixed, lead to a strategy of seeking the right formula in terms of a constitution that meets the core interests of each side. However, this disregards the observation that conflict involves complicated psychocultural processes.57
The contrasting perspective, represented by John Burton's "basic human needs" theory, explains that groups come into conflict when they seek redress for their grievances and recognition for their culture and identity. Burton represents a strategy of taking culture as a fixed and given quality.59 This puts the grievance model in opposition to the greed model of conflict. According to the grievance model, violence is a product of the deprivation of basic human needs for security, identity, and recognition. Therefore, conflict resolution requires that third parties intervene to supply these needs and to help the conflicting parties grant each other recognition and security.
Social constructivism in the conflict resolution literature is inadequately developed theoretically and fails to provide adequate attention to the human dimension. Within the conflict resolution literature, the concept of the sustainability of a peace-agreement has become associated with activities categorized as peacebuilding. Since the 1990s this term has received attention stimulated by U. N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 An Agenda for Peace.60 After this publication, the concept of building a sustainable peace has developed into an understanding that peacebuilding necessitates not just a change in the power and incentive structures, or even of political institutions, but also reconstructing complex and interdependent roles, relations and activities of functional social relationships.
In this regard, the advice of those who treat either identities or interests as fixed seems sterile compared to the requirements of peacebuilding.61 Instead, it is social constructivism that fulfills these requirements.62
Conflict resolution methodology based on rational instrumental logic does not reliably produce sustainable peace because unless there are changes in identity and interests, then monitoring and incentives can fail when external parties lose credibility, interest or capacity. Problem solving workshops, as promoted by basic human needs theory, lack the duration and other qualities needed to influence society at large. Only Sustained Dialogue, with its model for creating civil society, can plausibly enable a society-changing process to make sustainable peace possible.
A consolidated comparison of three perspectives in each of these three fields of social science results in the following table.
COMPARISON OF THEORETICAL PERSEPCTIVES
Collective
Identity
Theory
Name: |
Primordial |
Rational
Choice |
Socially
Constructed
|
Primary
Qualities: |
Fixed
Identities |
Fixed
Interests |
Identities & interests
as tools andnegotiated
|
|
Logic Form: |
Expressive |
Instrumental |
Collective interaction-
Communicative
|
|
Deficiency:
|
Structural-
Cannot
Explain
variance
|
Neglects variable
social & cultural identities
|
Must integrate
choice, culture
and context
|
Corresponding
Social
Movement
Theory:
|
Breakdown
Theory
|
Resource
Mobilization
|
Collective
Identity-Social
Constructivism
|
Conflict
Explanation:
|
Grievance-
Basic
Human
Needs
|
Greed-
Deterrence-
Security
Dilemma
|
Breakdown
in relations
|
Resolution
Method:
|
Problem-
solving
workshop
|
Monitoring,
power balancing,
incentives
|
Sustained Dialogue +
Civil society +
Incentive-based
Negotiations
|
While rational choice ignores culture and primordialism gives culture a structural function, which in its strong form determines action, to overcome these defects through either synthesis or social constructivism requires specifying the conditions under which cultural-identity can exert influence on behavior. Social constructivism does not claim that culture can function independently from the exercise of power or from the pursuit of economic prosperity. As Avruch and Black express it, " . . . culture does not 'cause' behavior – neither aggression, nor the business cycle, nor the grand flow of history – cultural analysis is not causal analysis."63 Within a framework of "mutual constitution," culture is created by the long-term aggregation of collective behavior.
However, in the short run, defining the influence of culture, in contrast to instrumental rationality, or the constraints of structures such as institutions, requires specifying conditions under which agents can use cultural identity as a tool and be influenced by the manipulation of identity through cultural symbols. For this reason, Pierre Bourdieu's concept of "relative cultural autonomy" –as a consequence of historical processes—provides a useful organizing concept, as amplified below.64
There has been little attention given to testing the social constructivist perspective on civil wars and their sustainable resolution, so there is little that supports or refutes these ideas. Collier and Sambanis conclude that "Until the profession has a body of well-specified theory, substantiated by quantitative analysis and the more informal evidence from case studies, the world of policy practitioners will continue to rely on rules of thumb."65 In the following section I propose a case-study format of the past ten years of Tajikistan's history from a social constructivist perspective.
Since social constructivism integrates culture, context and choice, given the context described earlier of conditions in Tajikistan, the remaining parts of an explanation involve the conditions under which cultural-identity could influence choices. Bourdieu listed three conditions for the relative autonomy of culture, 1) state supported universities and a media free from totalitarian control, 2) a differentiated society in which intellectuals can market their services and 3) a supportive regional base or faction of society. In Tajikistan during the past ten years all three of these conditions have changed, such that the degree of relative cultural autonomy on a graph would appear as a waveform.
A working hypothesis would propose that in a society with higher relative cultural autonomy, culture would enable some groups in society, which otherwise lack political and/or economic power, to secure outcomes to their benefit - even when those outcomes disadvantage those with economic and or political power. This hypothesis, that under conditions of high relative cultural autonomy, culture will shape the policies pursued by those actors who control the state, should not be considered as a simple positivist "If A, then B" model of direct causation. In a full social-constructivist model, following the model of Raymond Boudon, one could say that M is the phenomenon to be explained as a function of actions m, which are dependent on situations S of the actor.66
The model M = MmSM' means any phenomenon (M) can be explained through three interactive factors: individual actions (m), the social structure (S) and other preceding phenomenon (M') which result from a similar set of intertwined three factors in mutual constitution. Boudon claims universal applicability for this model and universal validity for the hypothesis that actors try to adapt to the situation confronting them.67 Neither structure nor agency can be ignored even though both are products of previous sets of phenomenon that result from the interactions of structure and agency. Descriptions of the structure and previous phenomenon are as necessary to explain a given social phenomenon as analyzing the actions of individuals.
In the case of Tajikistan, therefore, S would stand for the conditions of regional loyalties, high levels of social tension, the collapse of the Soviet Union and all the supportive conditions summarized earlier. Therefore, M' can stand for changing levels of cultural autonomy. Under this model, the individual is still a free agent, and through this independence can adapt to the social structure as it changes. In this case the actions of those representing the government or neo-communist side become explicable. Dividing the period 1991-2001 into different time periods leads to the following description of varying relative levels of cultural autonomy in Tajikistan.
- Period 1:
(From Soviet conquest till 1989): No autonomy of cultural production.
Strict centralized Soviet control over all institutions of cultural production (media, arts, and universities) until Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and Glasnost brought release.
- Period 2:
(1989- May 1992): Dramatically increased cultural autonomy.
Independence brought greater freedom of expression but the economic collapse undermined the influence of cultural producers. The regional bases of support for cultural producers (Panjikent, Gharm, Dushanbe and the Pamirs) were weak, and widely separated, hindering central coordination and further inhibiting their influence.
- Period 3:
(May 1992 until negotiations start --approximately 1995): No cultural autonomy.
Under the violent conditions of the civil war, many cultural producers fled either to Moscow, Iran or Afghanistan, or to the mountainous areas under opposition control, or abandoned any role as an autonomous interpreter of culture by giving their allegiance strictly to regional power forces.
- Period 4:
(1995-1999): Increased cultural autonomy.
During the peace negotiation period, democratic and nationalist intellectuals gained the patronage and protection of the UN. The operation of the OSCE, and the political conditions attached to loans and grants from the IMF and World Bank, also provided some freedom. Civil society began to develop and intellectuals experienced greater freedom to interpret and promote a tolerant pluralistic vision of Tajik identity. Through the "Inter-Tajik Dialogue" process the opposition coalesced to agree on a shared program of action in which those promoting tolerance and pluralism gained a mediating position. Through long-term repeated exposure under supportive conditions, the thinking of government decision-makers changed enough to permit a compromise peace agreement.
- Period 5:
(From the parliamentary elections of 1999 until the present):Cultural autonomy remains moderate.
The presence and monitoring of international organizations is part of the explanation of a moderate level of cultural autonomy. While the media practices self-censorship, competition is increasing slowly and civil society has grown rapidly. Even though the government now has fewer constraints, it has not eliminated the former opposition, but instead employs a modified, regionally based affirmative action program.
As a result of the negotiations, all parties agreed that in the future Tajikistan must be "united, secular, democratic and peaceful." The government leaders have had to accept "democratic" in spite of their communistic preferences or orientation to the same extent that the Islamists have had to accept "secular," or Tajikistan would never become either united or peaceful. In this process democrats and nationalists were able to mediate between these opposing camps and their interpretation of cultural-identity also prevailed. Their vision of a democratic and tolerant Tajikistan as the fulfillment of the historical character of Tajiks has become embodied in the official interpretation of national symbols.68 While the symbolic materials available for interpretation are in themselves ambiguous, there are limits to interpretation and in general the interpretations chosen are those which satisfy present social needs. Democrats and nationalists have had a greater influence not just because their autonomy has increased, but also because under the conditions of peace negotiations, their interpretation of the Tajik symbolic heritage met a recognized need. Their influence increased also because their autonomy increased through the involvement of much larger numbers of people in the civil society associations created as a result of the Sustained Dialogue. Islamists and those holding "neo-communist" preferences have adapted to changing social conditions.
The future material well being of Tajikistan will require state-led policies of economic promotion in order to gain foreign investment, which is in turn dependent on the sustained consolidation of social order. Tajikistan's experience with Sustained Dialogue is useful to show the significance of social constructivism and provides an example of peacebuilding in a multi-ethnic, post-conflict developing country context. Therefore, any lessons from Tajikistan would offer insight for other post-conflict states.69
NOTES
1 Mark I. Lichbach, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach, Alan S. Zuckerman, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 263.
2 "Identity can be taken to be the outcome of complex social processes which embed the person in a series of social contexts." P. W. Preston, Political/cultural Identity: Citizens and Nations in a Global Era, (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage publications, 1997), 53
3 Broome explains that the goal of understanding is not a product of disregarding oneself, nor empathy, but the creation of a higher universality, a synthesizing position created through the process of the interaction. "Interculturalists often use the phrase 'third culture' to describe the outcome of a long-term relationship." Benjamin J. Broome, "Managing Differences in Conflict Resolution," in Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application, ed. Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), 103.
4 Joseph P. Folger, "Evaluating Evaluation in Ethnic Conflict Resolution: Themes from, and Commentary on, the Haverford-Bryn Mawr Conference," in Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management: Theorizing Success and Failure, ed. Marc Howard Ross and Jay Rothman, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1999), 222.
5 Marc Howard Ross, "The Relevance of Culture for the Study of Political Psychology and Ethnic Conflict," in The Conflict and Culture Reader, ed. Pat K. Chew, (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 239.
6 Hugh Miall, The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Since 1945, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 66.
7 For example, Carol Mueller cites Gamson and Klandermans to say, "grievances, expectations and the calculations of costs and benefits are socially constructed within a collective context." Carol McClurg Mueller, "Building Social Movement Theory," in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), 7.
8 For example, I. William Zartman (1995), advocates 1) re-concentration of central power (make the powerful legitimate or the legitimate powerful) 2) increase state legitimacy; and 3) raise and allocate economic resources. All three changes require external help. He writes that the combination of a strongman leader, foreign support and economic resurrection are necessary for reconstruction. I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995).
9 Measurements of the rarity of sustained peace from a negotiated settlement of a civil war vary according to the database employed. For example, Hugh Miall writes, "The categories of conflict involving secession, religion and struggles for control of government included no peacefully resolved cases." A much higher measurement of success comes from Doyle and Sambanis, who cite 65.32% are strict failures and 34.68% successes. According to Roy Licklider, of the fifty-seven civil wars, starting from 1945 that ended before 1993, only one-fourth ended by negotiation, and of these, hostilities resumed in 75 percent. Hugh Miall, The Peacemakers, 187. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," American Political Science Review, 94, no. 4, (Dec 2000), 779. Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review, 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 684-685.
10 These observations derive from the author's experiences during the 2000-2001 academic year in which he taught international relations and economics at the Technological University of Tajikistan in Dushanbe. Interviews with former opposition leaders were conducted in July 2001. The author has the English translation of speeches and book excerpts by Foreign Minister Talbok Nazarov due to assisting with this translation.
11 "We, Tajiks went through [a] severe civil war and in spite of it, we were the first to conduct intensive negotiations with the armed opposition and to move closely to mutual understanding of the diametrically opposed forces of the country." "Speech of Emomali Rahmonov, President of the Republic of Tajikistan at the Meeting of Representatives of Political Parties, Political Associations and Cultural Centres of the Ethnic Groups of Tajikistan, March 1, 1996," in Agreement on National Conciliation of Tajikistan, ed. A. A. Abdumannonov, (Dushanbe: Public Council of the Republic of Tajikistan, 2000), 21.
12 These factors can be observed in the following quote from the speech, "Political Dialogue As A Base Of The Settlement Of The Inter-Tajik Conflict," given by the Academician Talbok Nazarov, Foreign Minister of Tajikistan, to the UN June, 2002. "… it was quite evident that the war was also religious in nature. In addition, the roots of the conflict lay rather deeper and were connected with the geopolitical interests of external forces and the temptation of various political parties and movements to usurp power."
13 "Hostage-Taking And Unrest In Eastern Tajikistan," Field Reports, Wednesday/July 4, 2001, [http://www.cacianalyst.org/July_4_2001/July_4_2001_Hosatge-Taking_and_Unrest.htm].
14 According to news reports, the President claimed he had still wanted to negotiate, but it was the Mayor that insisted on the use of force. Tajikistan Confirms Rebel Leaders Still At Large, 29 June, 2001. [http://www.cacianalyst.org/July_4_2001/July_4_2001_News_Bites.htm.]
15 According to Chetan Kumar, "Experts have argued that the most significant question with regard to civil wars is why certain civil wars do not resume after a cease-fire or an agreement." Chetan Kumar, "Conclusion," in Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, ed. Elizabeth M. Cousens, Chetan Kumar, and Karin Wermester, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 195.
16 According to Haas, using a database of 319 disputes from 1945 to 1985, "Neither the UN nor the regionals have successfully stopped ongoing hostilities with any consistency since the early 1960s. The record of both with respect to settling disputes has almost always been dismal." He goes on to explain, "We also know the UN's most persistent weakness: it is unable, except in rare circumstances, to settle any dispute with finality."Ernst B. Haas, Why We Still Need the United Nations: The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1984, (Berkeley: University of California, 1986), 17, 56.
17 Harold H. Saunders, A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflict, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 150.
18 Ibid., xxiii.
19 Ibid., 78.
20 Ibid., 84.
21 Ibid., 82.
22 Ibid., 155.
23 Ibid., 157.
24 Saunders says, "Their way of dealing with each other had changed." Ibid., 157.
25 Ibid., 241.
26 Ibid., 249.
27 In the words of its promoters, rational choice is the closest approach to a paradigm in current social science. Michael Hechter, "Rational Choice Theory and the Study of Race and Ethnic Relations," in Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations, ed. John Rex, David Mason, (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 264.
28 "In fact, much of the psychological literature suggests precisely the opposite: that distortions in decision making and deviations from a rational model occur frequently in international politics, with mixed survival consequences for the units in question." Kahler, ibid., 930. Rationalists thus tend toward a mechanical-behavioral view of subjectivity and adopt a particularly anemic or thin version of intentionality, rationality and interests. Actors are thus left with an impoverished orientation to action: People are computing devices and mechanical robots who calculate their interests. Rationalists who explain action in terms of exogenously changing prices thus inevitably slight the individual and group identity-formation process." Mark I. Lichbach, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach, Alan S. Zuckerman, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 256.
29 Miles Kahler, "Rationality in International Relations," International Organization, 52, no. 4, (Autumn 1998): 936.
30 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Bridging the Rational-Choice / Constructivist Gap? Theorizing Social Interaction in European Institutions," ARENA Working Papers -- WP 00/11--ARENA and University of Oslo, [http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp00_11.htm]
31 Advocacy of this idea is commonly attributed to Geertz (1963) referencing E. Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," British Journal of Sociology, (June 1957). Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford Geertz, (New York: The Free Press, 1963).
32 Primordial ties are in disrepute because of the "havoc wreaked, both upon themselves and others, by those modern (or semi-modern) states that did passionately seek to become primordial rather than civil political communities" Geertz (1963), ibid., 112.
33 "In sharpest contrast with most academic analysts of nationalism, those who have successfully mobilized nations have understood that at the core of ethnopsychology is the sense of shared blood, and they have not hesitated to appeal to it." Walker Conner, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 197.
34 The journalistic model blames ethnic violence on "ancient hatreds" rather than on the strategies of politicians, and in justifying the initial reluctance of the US to become involved in the former Yugoslavia, George H. W. Bush invoked the same model. It is also part of Lenin's organismic model of groups coalescing into shared language, economic system and territory, thereby evolving from a group to a tribe, to a people and finally to a nation. See especially Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997.
35 "Ethnicity is so elusive and difficult to understand precisely because ethnic identity is both primordial and residual, and original location and source of identity, and a residual category left behind by national citizenship or class location." Michael S. Kimmel, "Tradition as Revolt: The Moral and Political Economy of Ethnic Nationalism," in Current Perspectives in Social Theory 16, ed. Jennifer M Lehmann, (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press Inc. 1996), 77. See also Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 70.
36 Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interest: A Sociology of International Relations, (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press 1999), 69.
37 Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," American Sociological Review, 51 (April 1986), 277.
38 "It is clear that identity is socially constructed, carried in language, expressed in mundane routine, liable to revision and routinely contested as we move through life." Preston, P. W., ibid., pp. 16-17, and 76.
39 Sheila L. Croucher, "Constructing the Ethnic Spectacle: Identity Politics in a Postmodern World," in The Ethnic Entanglement: Conflict and Intervention in World Politics, ed. John F. Stack, Jr. and Lui Hebron. (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 130.
40 For example, Miller insists that identities change as a result of changes in social relations. Byron Miller, "Collective Action and Rational Choice: Place, Community and the Limits to Individual Self- Interest," Economic Geography 68, no. 1 (January 1992), 34. "This research demonstrates persuasively that objective measures of self-interest will often be weak predictors of policy preferences when values such as political ideology and racial prejudice are taken into account." Dennis Chong, Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 6.
41 Sujarta Chakrabarti Pasic, "Culturing International Relations Theory: A Call for Extension," in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 87.
42 Pasic, ibid., 90.
43 Bert Useem, "Breakdown Theories of Collective Action," in Annual Review of Sociology 24, ed. Karen S. Cook and John Hagan, Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews (1998): 215-38
44 Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," in Annual Review of Sociology, 27, ed. Karen S. Cook and John Hagan (Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, 2001).
45 Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), 27
46 Mabel Berezin, "Politics and Culture: A Less Fissured Terrain," in Annual Review of Sociology 23, ed. Karen S. Cook and John Hagan, (Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews Inc., 1997), 376.
47 Miller, ibid., 39.
48 Dennis J. D. Sandole, "Future Directions in Theory and Research," in Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application, ed. Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), 279.
49 For example, Gregory Saxton, in commenting on the inadequacies of the nationalist identity literature, blames this on the failure to integrate it with social movement literature. Gregory D. Saxton, "Structure, Politics, and Action: An Integrated Model of Nationalist Protest and Rebellion," Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, Minorities at Risk Project, http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/Structure%20Politics%20Action.pdf.
50 Examples of this literature include Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). Furthermore, Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd Ed., (New York: The Free Press, 1988) is best known for his conclusion that states fight because of optimism, believing that they can win.
51 Barry Wolf, "When the Weak Attack the Strong: Failures of Deterrence," A Rand Note: N-3261-A, Prepared for the U. S. Army. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1990
52 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." World Bank, October 21, 2001. [http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedandgrievance.htm.] As a representative of the greed model, Todd Sandler claims, " . . . disputes over territories and resources already represent the leading cause of civil war and interstate conflicts." Todd Sandler, "Economic Analysis of Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44, no. 6, (December 2000), 724-5.
53 I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 266-73.
54 John M. Richardson Jr. and Jianxin Wang, "Peace Accords: Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies, " in Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict, ed. K. M. de Siva and S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1999), 179.
55 The 50% Solution: How to Bargain Successfully With Hijackers, Strikers, Bosses, Oil Magnates, Arabs, Russians and Other Worthy Opponents in this Modern World, ed. I. William Zartman. (New Haven; London: Yale University Press), 1983.
56 See Kumar, ibid., 211.
57 There are two generally accepted routes by which parties' positions can converge. One is when either or both parties make compromises either coerced or voluntary. The other is through the discovery of creative outcomes that can bridge the interests of both without either having to make extensive compromises. Miall, ibid., 65.
58 "And this is why, we would argue, for conflict resolution theory and practice to ignore cultural dynamics is to invite failure, for problem-solving workshops and beyond." Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict Resolution, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998),100.
59 "In this approach to conflict resolution, the nature of the human being and the identity group is a given. The resolution of problems and conflict is based on an acceptance of the individual and identity group as givens." John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, (Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press, 1990), 153.
60 This pattern of thinking developed out of an evaluation of failures of humanitarian and military peacekeeping projects since the 1970s. "Humanitarian aid and military peacekeeping were not enough. They did not address the root causes of conflict or secure social development beyond emergencies" Michael Pugh, "Introduction: The Ownership of Regeneration and Peacebuilding," In Regeneration of War Torn Societies, ed. Michael Pugh, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 4.
61 For instance, I. William Zartman (1995) advocates the combination of a strongman leader, foreign support and economic resurrection that is necessary for reconstruction, and Stedman (1997) puts the emphasis on the elimination, management, or control of "spoilers. " Stephan John Stedman, 1997, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security 22 (Fall): 5-53. I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman. (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995).
62 One of the classic expositions of the contribution of a social constructivist approach to peacebuilding is the focus on relationships in John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).
63 Kevin Avruch and Peter W. Black, "Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings," in Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application, ed. Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), 135.
64 David Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997) 127. "Historically, Bourdieu sees cultural fields progressively developing and gaining autonomy from the political and economic fields."
65 Collier and Sambanis, ibid., 12.
66 "M is to be interpreted as a function of M(mI) of a range of individual actions mi, which themselves are, . . . functions mi(Si) of the structure Si of the situation including the social agents or actors ." Raymond Boudon, Theories of Social Change: A Critical Appraisal, Trans. J. C. Whitehouse, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 30.
67 Boudon, ibid., 138. Boudon also grants autonomy to the role of ideas, or collective decisions based on a system of beliefs, which he calls paradigms, but which seem close to culture.
68 The Minister of Culture (Abdurahim Rahimov, July 7, 2001), explained the official interpretation of the meaning of the Somonid era. He rejected the statement that "The Somonis should be understood as a symbol of power and control." He replied, "They didn’t rule nations or peoples, they only organized the area. Better to say they are not the symbol of power and control, but of spiritualism and intellect." Other answers regarding the identity of Uzbeks and the status of Tajiki conform to a nationalist standpoint.
69 This is the tenor of the government's portrayal of how sustainable peace is being developed in Tajikistan, as shown in the following excerpts from Foreign Minister Talbok Nazarov's speech, "Political Dialogue As A Base Of The Settlement Of The Inter-Tajik Conflict." to the UN. " . . . the experience of conflict resolution by political dialogue may be used in those countries where the "syndrome" of civil war still prevails. The civil war in Tajikistan, as we have said, was resolved in a short time by means of political dialogue -- the main instrument during the transition from the war to peace."
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